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Competency to Stand Trial in Federal Courts:
Conceptual and Constitutional Problems
William T. Pizzit
In 1898 Thomas Youtsey was indicted on federal charges of
embezzling and willfully misapplying some $60,000 as the cashier
of the First National Bank of Newport, Kentucky.' Trial prepara-
tion was hampered by a series of severe epileptic attacks which
impaired the defendant's memory to such an extent that he had
trouble remembering even day-to-day events, let alone the transac-
tions that were the basis of the indictment. Accordingly, counsel for
Youtsey sought a continuance on the grounds that Youtsey's mem-
ory and judgment were impaired. In addition to offering the affida-
vits of three physicians who had examined the defendant, counsel
was willing to have the defendant undergo any mental or physical
exam that the court might find appropriate for determining whether
the defendant should be tried. The court denied the motion for
continuance, and the jury convicted Youtsey, rejecting defense ar-
guments that Youtsey was not sane, or if sane, was so mentally
impaired that he lacked the requisite mens rea for the crime
charged.
2
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit reversed Youtsey's conviction,
holding that the trial court's denial of the defense counsel's pretrial
motion was erroneous. 3 The court noted that the defense motion,
although nominally a motion for a continuance, was in reality aimed
at preventing any trial due to the "present insanity" of the defen-
dant. When the issue of "present insanity" is raised, the accused has
the right to have that issue considered because "[ilt is not 'due
process of law' to subject an insane person to trial upon an indict-
ment involving liberty or life."4 In support of its opinion, the Sixth
Circuit cited a number of common law authorities. According to
Hale, an incapacitated defendant "ought not by law to be arraigned
.... but be remitted to prison until that incapacity be removed.
The reason is because he cannot advisedly plead to the indict-
ment." 5 The court quoted Bishop's Criminal Procedure:
t Associate Professor of Law, University of Colorado.
United States v. Youtsey, 91 F. 864 (C.C.D. Ky. 1898).
2 Id. at 871-72, 876, 880 (reporting in full the instructions of the trial court).
3 Youtsey v. United States, 97 F. 937 (6th Cir. 1899).
Id. at 941.
Id. at 940 (quoting M. HALE, THE HIsToRY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 34 (1847)).
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An insane man cannot even plead to an indictment. Therefore,
if, at the arraignment, counsel have reason to suppose their
client too insane to take his trial, they should then make the
objection, which, it is believed, can be adequately done orally
to the court. Or the objection may proceed from a third person
on affidavit, or the court may take it on its own observations.'
On the basis of these and other common law authorities the court
concluded that "[i]t is fundamental that an insane person can
neither plead to an arraignment, be subjected to trial, or, after trial,
receive judgment, or, after judgment, undergo punishment."7
Although there was no federal statute specifying procedures for
the disposition of the issue, the court held that the trial judge should
have employed a method of his own choice in order to determine if
the defendant was capable of defending himself. Personal inspection
of the defendant by the trial judge and the use of an advisory jury
were among the possible techniques suggested by earlier cases
which the Sixth Circuit indicated were available to the trial court.8
In reversing the conviction, the court said that "some mode, in the
discretion of the court, [should] be adopted for a thorough investi-
gation of the sanity of the accused," 9 before Youtsey could be re-
tried.
Even though the procedures for determining competency are
now mandatory in the federal courts and in most state jurisdictions,
the Youtsey case illustrates many of the problems surrounding the
issue of present insanity, or, as it is now commonly called, compe-
tency to stand trial. First, the fact pattern of Youtsey is fairly typi-
cal. While competency may be raised at any point in the progression
of criminal proceedings, it is usually raised at or soon after arraign-
ment, 0 and is usually brought to the court's attention by defense
counsel, who may have experienced some difficulty in communicat-
ing with his client."
Second, Youtsey illustrates the important distinction between




o JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE
ON PROBLEMS CONNECTED WITH MENTAL EXAMINATION OF THE ACCUSED IN CRIMINAL CASES 24
(1965) [hereinafter cited as D.C. STUDY]. The D.C. Study is based in part on a review of the
docket entries of all persons indicted in the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia from July 1, 1951 through July 30, 1963. Id. at 5.
1 The D.C. Study found that from fiscal 1952 through fiscal 1963, 85.7% of the motions
that requested pretrial mental examination of the defendant were filed by the defense. Id. at
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competency to stand trial and the insanity defense. The term
"competency at the time of the offense '1 2 is often used in the context
of a discussion of insanity, while the term "insanity at the time of
trial' ' ' 3 has been used to describe questions of competency, creating
the impression that competency and the insanity defense are closely
related. Although psychiatric experts are relied upon in determining
questions of both competency and insanity, the issues involved are
very different. In Youtsey both an insanity defense and a defense
based on the defendant's incapacity to entertain the requisite mens
rea were raised and subsequently rejected by the jury. But this
determination did not resolve the issue of the defendant's compe-
tency to stand trial. Insanity is a trial defense concerned with the
defendant's mental condition at the time of the crime. Competency,
on the other hand, concerns the defendant's ability to interact with
his attorney and to understand the proceedings he faces. The court
in Youtsey suggested that an inquiry into competency should focus
on "the mental capacity of the accused to understand the proceed-
ings against him, and rationally advise with his counsel as to his
defense."" In Dusky v. United States,5 the Supreme Court ex-
panded and clarified this definition. The test, said the Court, is
whether the defendant "has sufficient present ability to consult
with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding
-and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of
the proceedings against him."' 6
In this article I shall examine the procedures for determining
competency in federal courts and shall consider in order the manner
of raising the issue, the psychiatric examination, and the compe-
tency hearing. I shall be concerned throughout this article with
working out the implications of the competency issue for the defen-
dant, the trial court, the government attorney, and, in particular,
the defense attorney. I shall suggest that the present procedures
raise serious constitutional problems and, in the final section, I shall
discuss reform of the present procedures on competency-in partic-
12 See, e.g., United States v. Munz, 542 F.2d 1382, 1384 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1104 (1977); United States v. Maret, 433 F.2d 1064, 1066 (8th Cir. 1970).
," See, e.g., Lee v. Wiman, 280 F.2d 257, 264 (5th Cir. 1960); United States ex rel. Leon
v. Banmiller, 179 F. Supp. 390, 392 (E.D. Pa. 1959).
1" 97 F. at 944.
, 362 U.S. 402 (1960) (per curiam).
, Id. While the test in Dusky remains the standard test for competency, the Ninth
Circuit has adopted a second test which is aimed at determining a defendant's competency
to plead guilty. The position of the Ninth Circuit is discussed in note 46 infra.
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ular, the provision on competency now being considered by Con-
gress as part of the Criminal Code Reform Act of 1977.1
I. RAISING THE ISSUE OF COMPETENCY
In 1949 Congress first enacted legislation'" (now codified at sec-
tions 4244-48 of title 18 of the United States Code) that deals com-
prehensively with the problems presented by defendants (1) who are
awaiting trial and might be incompetent (section 4244), (2) who are
in prison pursuant to conviction and believed to have been incompe-
tent at trial (section 4245), or (3) who have become insane and
dangerous while in prison and whose sentences are about to expire
(section 4247). James V. Bennett,'9 then Director of the United
States Prisons, and then Attorney General Tom C. Clark,2" among
those urging passage of the bill, expressed concern over the number
of prisoners who had been convicted and sent to federal prisons even
though they probably were not competent to stand trial in the first
place.
2'
Section 4244 concerns the determination of competency prior to
trial. The statute requires the United States Attorney to file a mo-
tion for judicial determination of the accused's competency when-
ever he has "reasonable cause to believe" that the accused "may be
presently insane or otherwise so mentally incompetent as to be un-
able to understand the proceedings against him or properly to assist
in his own defense .... ,,22 Upon the government attorney's motion,
,1 S. 1437 entitled "The Criminal Code Reform Act of 1977" was introduced into the
Senate by Senators McClellan and Kennedy on May 2, 1977. 123 Cong. Rec. S6833 (daily
ed. May 2, 1977). The bill was voted out of the Senate Judiciary Committee on November 2,
1977 by a vote of 14-2. 35 CONG. QTRLY. WEEKLY REPORT 2364 (Nov. 5, 1977).
IN Actually the bill was introduced into the 80th Congress as S. 850 and hearings were
held on it by a Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee. Hearings on S. 850 Before
a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1948) [hereinafter
cited as Hearings]. Although the bill was reported out of the Judiciary Committee, it failed
of further action and was reintroduced in the 81st Congress where it was enacted. CARE AND
CUSTODY OF INSANE PERSONS CHARGED WITH OR CONVICTED OF OFFENSES AGAINST THE UNITED
STATES, S. REP. No. 209, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949).
1g Hearings, supra note 18, at 12-13 (testimony of James V. Bennett).
2 CARE AND CUSTODY OF INSANE FEDERAL PRISONERS, S. REP. No. 1511, 80th Cong., 2d Sess.
2 (1948) (letter of Tom C. Clark).
21 The bill, as passed, was similar to a proposal that had been drawn up by a subcommit-
tee of senior circuit judges chaired by Judge Calvert Magruder; this judicial proposal was
approved by the Judicial Conference of the United States. See REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CON-
FERENCE OF SENIOR CIRCUIT JUDGES, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 27 (1947).
22 18 U.S.C. § 4244 (1970). In 1955 Congress passed a competency statute dealing solely
with the District of Columbia, 24 D.C. CODE § 301 (1973), which appears slightly narrower
than section 4244. Section 301(a) requires a showing of "prima facie" evidence of incompe-
tency to raise the issue. But the statute has been liberally interpreted, see Mitchell v. United
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or a similar motion on behalf of the accused, or on its own motion,
the court
shall cause the accused, whether or not previously admitted to
bail, to be examined as to his mental condition by at least one
qualified psychiatrist, who shall report to the court. For the
purpose of the examination the court may order the accused
committed for such reasonable period as the court may deter-
mine to a suitable hospital or other facility to be designated by
the court. If the report of the psychiatrist indicates a state of
present insanity or such mental incompetency in the accused,
the court shall hold a hearing, upon due notice, at which evi-
dence as to the mental condition of the accused may be submit-
ted, including that of the reporting psychiatrist, and make a
finding with respect thereto.?
Essentially section 4244 mandates psychiatric examination
whenever competency is raised. If the psychiatric report indicates
that the defendant may be incompetent, there must be a hearing
on the question and the court must make a finding on the issue. If
the court finds that the defendant is incompetent, section 4246 au-
thorizes the court to commit the defendant to the custody of the




The common law approach to problems of competency stressed
the trial court's responsibility to recognize and respond to evidence
suggesting that the defendant may not be competent to stand trial.
Indeed, it has long been recognized that the trial court is empowered
States, 316 F.2d 354, 360 (D.C. Cir. 1963), and appears to have made little difference in the
practice in the District. See D.C. STUDY, supra note 10, at 22-23. See also discussion at note
121 infra.
- 18 U.S.C. § 4244 (1970).
21 18 U.S.C. § 4246 (1970). The procedural aspects of section 4246 of the 1949 bill were
probably less important to trial courts and federal prosecutors than the fact that the bill
called for suitable facilities for examining defendants and for holding defendants found in-
competent. Judge Magruder testified before the Judiciary Subcommittee:
It is the power and duty of the judge to be assured the man is competent to stand trial,
and the fact of the matter is in many cases I have been told, judges blink at the fact
because the Government has, so to speak, the bear by the tail and does not know what
to do with him if it does not try him and put him in jail, because there is not [sic]
procedure by which a person who is charged with crime but who is incapable of being
tried because of mental condition-there is no procedure by which such person could be
held indefinitely even though he may be one who would be a menace to be left at large.
Hearings, supra note 18, at 5.
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to raise the issue on its own motion.25
This special responsibility of the trial court has been reaffirmed
by the Supreme Court in two recent cases." In Pate v. Robinson
the Supreme Court reversed a murder conviction because evidence
introduced at trial showed that the defendant had a long history of
severe mental problems punctuated with violence to himself and
others. The Supreme Court concluded that in the face of such evi-
dence the trial court's failure to order an inquiry into Robinson's
competence to stand trial violated Robinson's right to a fair trial.
In the most recent Supreme Court case on competency-Drope
v. Missouri'-the trial court failed to order an inquiry into the
competency of the defendant despite the report during the trial that
the defendant had attempted suicide by shooting himself. Other
information questioning the defendant's competency had been
brought to the court's attention prior to and during the trial, includ-
ing testimony from the defendant's wife as to the defendant's bi-
zarre behavior and need for psychiatric care. The Supreme Court
held that the suicide attempt viewed in conjunction with the other
information mandated suspension of the trial until an evaluation
and hearing concerning the defendant's competence. The Court de-
clared that "[e]ven when a defendant is competent at the com-
mencement of his trial, a trial court must always be alert to cir-
cumstances suggesting a change that would render the accused
unable to meet the standards of competence to stand trial.
'29
21 See 2 J. BISHOP, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 666 (3d ed. 1880). See also Rex v. Frith, 22
How. St. Tr. 307, 310 (1790), where the defendant was charged with treason, and counsel for
the defendant sought a trial continuance which the defendant opposed. In the course of
argument over the continuance, the court itself raised the issue of the defendant's competency
with the following observation:
It is impossible for the most inattentive observer not to be aware that there may in this
case be a previous inquiry necessary: such is the humanity of the law of England, that
in all stages both when the act is committed, at the time when the prisoner makes his
defence, and even at the day of execution, it is important to settle what his state of mind
is; and at the time he is called to plead, if there are circumstances that suggest to one's
mind that he is not in the possession of his reason, we must certainly be careful that
nothing is introduced into the administration of justice, but what belongs to that admin-
istration. The justice of the law has provided a remedy in such cases; therefore I think
there ought now to be an inquiry made, touching the sanity of this man at this time;
w hether he is in a situation of mind to say what his grounds of defence here are. I know
it is untrodden ground though it is constitutional: then get a jury together to inquire into
the present state of his mind; the twelve men that are here will do.
Id. at 311 (note omitted).
21 Drope v, Missouri, 420 U.S. 162 (1975); Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966).
- 383 U.S. 375 (1966).
- 420 U.S. 162 (1975).
21 Id. at 181.
[45:21
Competency to Stand Trial
The Supreme Court's opinions in Robinson and Drope indicate
that due process requires trial courts to raise competency sua
sponte. 30 Although section 4244 does not expressly require courts to
raise the issue of competency, federal courts have repeatedly held
that due process imposes such an obligation on trial courts.',
B. Defense Counsel
For practical reasons, the key to the competency issue is the
defense attorney. The defense attorney has the most exposure to his
client, and, unlike the court or prosecutor, he witnesses his client's
behavior on various occasions and in various settings and circum-
stances. Given the test for incompetency, the importance of the
defense attorney is not surprising; he generally has the best oppor-
tunity to notice any defects in the defendant's "ability to consult
with his lawyer. 3 2 By contrast, the court's contacts with the defen-
dant are fleeting and are usually limited to observations of the de-
fendant in a formal courtroom setting, where the defendant's active
participation is minimal and where a certain amount of confusion
and nervousness on the part of the defendant is to be expected.
Moreover, in many of the cases that go to trial, and particularly in
those cases that result in a guilty plea,3  the court may not even hear
direct testimony from the defendant. Thus, the defense attorney is
usually in the best position to raise the question of competency.
But raising competency may result in consequences that are
very undesirable for a defendant. Under section 4246 the court is
authorized to commit an accused defendant found incompetent to
the custody of the Attorney General "until the accused shall be
mentally competent to stand trial or until the pending charges
' In both Drope and Robinson, state statutes required the trial court to investigate the
issue of competency sua sponte, whenever the evidence suggested reason to believe the defen-
dant might be incompetent. Illinois at the time of Robinson's conviction required a hearing
when the evidence before the court raised a "bona fide doubt" as to the defendant's compe-
tence. 1935 ILL. REv. STAT., ch. 38, §§ 592, 593 (repealed 1961). The Missouri statute requires
a judge to order an examination when a judge or magistrate has "reasonable cause to believe"
the defendant is incompetent. Mo. REv. STAT. § 552.020(2) (1969). Both statutes are discussed
in Drope, 420 U.S. at 172-73. The Court in Drope characterized Pate as holding "that the
failure to observe procedures adequate to protect a defendant's right not to be tried or
convicted while incompetent to stand trial deprives him of his due process right to a fair
trial." 420 U.S. at 172.
3' See, e.g., Durham v. Wyrick, 545 F.2d 41, 44 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v. DiGilio,
538 F.2d 972, 987 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 733 (1977).
2 See text at note 16 supra.
13 In fiscal year 1974, for example, 85% of the defendants convicted in federal courts
entered pleas of guilty or nolo contendere. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
COURTS, FEDERAL OFFENDERS IN UNITED STATES DISTRICT CouRTs 1972, Table H-I (1975).
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against him are disposed of according to law."34 Under Jackson v.
Indiana35 the commitment of an incompetent defendant charged
with a crime cannot exceed "a reasonable period of time necessary
to determine whether there is a substantial probability that he will
attain that capacity in the foreseeable future."36 If it is determined
that there is no such probability, the state must institute civil com-
mitment proceedings or release the defendant. Even if it is deter-
mined that the defendant will soon regain competency, his commit-
ment can only be justified by a showing of continued progress. But
even though permanent commitment is ruled out by Jackson and
though section 4246 was never intended to allow indefinite commit-
ment of the permanently incompetent, 37 the temporary commit-
ment under section 4246 may nevertheless amount to a year or
more. 8 Furthermore, the determination of incompetency may lead
to attempts to have the defendant civilly committed under state
law. 9 For a defendant facing minor charges, or a first time offender,
a finding of incompetency may result in an involuntary hospitaliza-
tion that substantially exceeds any sentence that might have re-
sulted from his conviction," and, if he regains competency, he still
3 18 U.S.C. § 4246 (1970).
406 U.S. 715 (1972).
's Id. at 738.
3' See Hearings, supra note 18, at 7 (testimony of Judge Calvert Magruder). See generally
Jackson v. Indiana, which notes a long line of federal cases indicating that the use of §§ 4244
and 4246 to provide a means of indefinite commitment is improper. 406 U.S. at 733.
I" In Drendel v. United States, 403 F.2d 55 (5th Cir. 1968) the Fifth Circuit took note of
the policy at the Medical Center for Federal Prisoners in Springfield, Missouri, where many
federal prisoners are sent when they are found incompetent. The Center's policy is to work
with the defendant for up to eighteen months before making a determination of permanent
incompetency.
The D.C. Study showed an erratic decline year by year in the average number of months
that a defendant was hospitalized prior to regaining competency. From July 1, 1952, through
June 30, 1953, the average was slightly over 26 months; from July 1, 1961 through June 30,
1962, it was down to slightly under 11 months. D.C. STUDY, supra note 10, at 160.
A comprehensive four year study of competency by a team of psychiatrists and lawyers
conducted in mental hospitals and state courts in Massachusetts found that with the excep-
tion of those defendants who are retarded, most incompetent defendants respond well to
treatment and can be expected to regain a competent state within weeks or months of active
treatment. The study was funded by the National Institute of Mental Health. LABORATORY
OF COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY, HARVARD MEDICAL SCHOOL, COMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL AND MEN-
TAL ILLNESS 65 (DHEW Publ. No. (HSM) 73-9105 (1973)) [hereinafter cited as
MASSACHUSE'rs STUDY].
3, Cf. United States v. Curry, 410 F.2d 1372 (4th Cir. 1969) (§ 4248 authorizes protective
detention by the Attorney General or transfer to an institution of the state of defendant's
residence if defendant is found to be dangerous).
10 In fiscal year 1974 over half of the defendants convicted in federal district courts were
placed on probation or fined. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, FEDERAL
OFFENDERS IN UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS 1972, Table H-1 (1975).
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faces possible conviction and sentence on the outstanding criminal
charges.'
The length of hospitalization is not the only possible adverse
consequence of raising the competency issue. While a delay in trial
may be expected to work to the disadvantage of the government in
most cases, in certain cases a prompt trial may afford the accused
his best chance for an acquittal. If the defendant intends to raise
an affirmative defense or if the government is having problems lo-
cating a particular witness or certain evidence, any delay in trial
may not be in the best interests of the defendant, particularly if he
is ultimately found competent to stand trial.
Thus, the person with the best access to indicia of a defendant's
incompetency-his attorney-may have strong incentives not to
reveal his knowledge. Section 4244 does not impose a duty on de-
fense counsel to raise the issue of competency.2 The consensus
among commentators is that counsel should raise the issue only if
it is in "the client's best interests. 43
This view is troubling. To leave disclosure to the discretion of
defense counsel is, in effect, to assert that there is nothing-improper
in an attorney's proceeding to pleadings or trial with an incompe-
tent criminal defendant. If counsel is free to decide that, despite his
client's incompetency, it is in the client's best interest to proceed,
the accused will be deprived of the right to participate intelligently
in his own defense.
Consider the options facing counsel when he is confronted with
a client whom he believes to be incompetent. Certainly a guilty plea
may be an attractive alternative, for it is likely that the defendant's
incompetency will increase the risk of surprise at trial and make a
strong defense very difficult. But while it is counsel's function to
present plea alternatives to his client and to make recommenda-
tions, the decision to plead belongs solely to the defendant and he
It should also be noted that with the exception of the District of Columbia, there are no
commitment procedures for a defendant who raises a successful insanity defense in federal
courts. United States v. McCracken, 488 F.2d 406, 416 (5th Cir. 1974). Section 3613 of S. 1437,
the proposed revision of the federal criminal code, see note 17 supra, would change the present
law by providing procedures for committing a defendant acquitted by reason of insanity.
1 See Guy v. Ciccone, 439 F.2d 400, 401 (8th Cir. 1971). However, any sentence subse-
quently imposed should be reduced by the period of involuntary hospitalization.
12 The statute requires the court to order a psychiatric examination if a motion is made
by anyone "in behalf of the accused." 18 U.S.C. § 4244 (1970). The language may suggest
that the draftsmen assumed such motions would be brought by attorneys only when to do so
served the client's best interests.
11 See Eizenstat, Mental Competency to Stand Trial, 4 HAnv. C.R.-C.L. Rav. 379, 383-
84 (1969); Golten, Role of Defense Counsel in the Criminal Commitment Process, 10 Am.
CRIM. L. REV. 385, 389 (1972); Note, Incompetency to Stand Trial, 81 HARv. L. REv. 454, 467
(1967).
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is, of course, free to see his interests differently from his attorney.
As the Supreme Court has stated, it is the defendant who must
"with the help of counsel, rationally weigh the advantages of going
to trial against the advantages of pleading guilty. '4  If counsel al-
lows his client to enter a plea that is not voluntary because the
defendant is not competent, the attorney has failed in his primary
obligation to ensure that the client's decision to plead is knowing
and intelligent.45
The decision to enter a plea of not guilty and go to trial is really
no different. A defendant who is unable to waive rights can hardly
be said to be meaningfully asserting those rights. 4 That counsel is
present makes no difference for the decision to accept counsel is
itself a matter of choice for a defendant. In Faretta v. California
47
the Supreme Court held that a defendant in a state case has a right
to self-representation under the sixth amendment and fourteenth
amendment and that counsel cannot be forced on a defendant who
voluntarily and intelligently elects to represent himself. The Court
stated that:
The Sixth Amendment does not provide merely that a
defense shall be made for the accused; it grants to the accused
personally the right to make his defense. It is the accused, not
counsel, who must be "informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation," who must be "confronted with witnesses against
him," and who must be accorded "compulsory process for ob-
taining witnesses in his favor."...
It is true that when a defendant chooses to have a lawyer
" Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 750 (1970).
See McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 769-70 (1970).
4 One court has pointed out that procedural rights at trial have no value if the defendant
is incompetent. Martin v. Estelle, 546 F.2d 177, 180 (5th Cir. 1977) (quoting Note,
Incompetency to Stand Trial, 81 HAlv. L. Rnv. 454, 457 (1967)). For this reason I think that
the Ninth Circuit has made a mistake in deciding that the competency level required to stand
trial is different from the competency required to plead guilty. In Sieling v. Eyman, 478 F.2d
211 (9th Cir. 1973) the court first indicated that competency to stand trial does not suffice to
show competency to plead guilty. But see United States ex rel. McGough v. Hewitt, 528 F.2d
339, 342 n.2 (3d Cir. 1975). The Ninth Circuit has required that in addition to the ability to
understand and assist at his trial, the defendant who wishes to plead guilty must have the
capacity to make a reasoned choice between standing trial and pleading guilty. Sailer v.
Gunn, 548 F.2d 271, 275 (9th Cir. 1977).
This view ignores the fact that going to trial is itself a choice and trial will involve even
further decisions. The danger of the dual standard is that it will weaken the standard of
competency to stand trial. The ability to make reasoned choices should be viewed as part of
the ability to understand the proceedings and assist counsel at trial. See Note, Competence
to Plead Guilty: A New Standard, .1974 DuKE L. J. 149.
,7 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
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manage and present his case, law and tradition may allocate
to the counsel power to make binding decisions of trial strategy
in many cases .... This allocation can only be justified, how-
ever, by the defendant's consent, at the outset, to accept coun-
sel as his representative."
The Court's decision reminds us that procedural guarantees are
designed not only to ensure the reliability of fact-finding, but also
to safeguard the defendant's dignity as an individual." The Court
in Faretta conceded that its decision might result in some loss of
reliability since most defendants would be better off with the
assistance of counsel. Nevertheless, the Court concluded that
"[p]ersonal liberties are not rooted in the law of averages," and the
defendant's choice "must be honored out of 'that respect for the
individual which is the lifeblood of the law."' 50 It has been suggested
that the bar to the trial of an incompetent defendant is anachronis-
tic in this day of appointed counsel, because counsel can ensure the
fairness of the trial even if the defendant cannot.5' But even if coun-
sel could guarantee a reliable trial,5" something important in the
criminal process is lost when a defendant is convicted in a proceed-
ing he does not understand and in which he cannot play even a
minimal role.5 3
Id. at 819-21.
See generally Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952); Kadish, Methodology and
Criteria in Due Process Adjudication-A Survey and Criticism, 66 YALE L. J. 319, 347 (1957).
" Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 (1975) (quoting Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337,
350-51 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring)).
"' See Burt & Morris, A Proposal for the Abolition of the Incompetency Plea, 40 U. CHI.
L. REv. 66, 75 (1972); Foote, A Comment on Pre-Trial Commitment of Criminal Defendants,
108 U. PA. L. REv. 832, 844 (1960); Note, Incompetency to Stand Trial, 81 HARv. L. REV. 454,
467 (1967).
"2 In Faretta the Court suggested that much of the benefit of counsel may not be properly
realized if the defendant does not want counsel. 422 U.S. at 832-35. That will certainly be
equally true if the defendant is incompetent and cannot assist counsel. It may be that without
help from the defendant many affirmative defenses will be foreclosed, particularly if the
defendant is unable to testify.
13 A nice compromise are those statutes which allow counsel to proceed with legal mo-
tions not requiring the personal participation of the defendant, e.g., N.Y. CaRn. PRoc. LAw §
730.60(5) (McKinney 1971); MONT. REv. CODEs ANN. § 95-506(c) (1969), or those which allow
"acquittal only" trials of particular defenses which cannot result in a guilty verdict. E.g.,
MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 123, § 17(b) (Michie/Law Co-op 1972). The Supreme Court in Jackson
noted such statutes without disapproval. 406 U.S. at 740-41.
One proposal which I think is unacceptable is that put forward by Professors Burt and
Morris, supra note 51. They would allow a defendant who cannot be restored to competency
to be put on trial. There would be available some additional safeguards: (1) broader discov-
ery; (2) a higher burden of proof from the government on the defense motion for a judgment
of acquittal; and (3) the jury would be instructed that "in weighing the evidence against the
defendant, it should take into account, in the defendant's favor, the disabilities under which
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Behind the question of counsel's role in raising the issue of
competency lurk difficult questions concerning the control that a
defense lawyer is entitled to exercise in conducting a criminal case.
The proper extent of counsel's control over the various strategic
decisions at trial has always been somewhat uncertain, particularly
when those decisions affect the defendant's constitutional rights. 4
There is support in the caselaw for the proposition that even when
counsel is retained, it is ultimately for the defendant to decide
whether to waive his presence at trial,55 whether to waive a jury
trial," or whether to testify.1T Although Faretta pays lip service to
he went to trial." It seems very doubtful to me that these safeguards would provide an
accurate determination of guilt in many cases. Their justification for allowing trial in such
cases stems from their concern that many defendants who are permanently incompetent may
be civilly committed and held indefinitely. But the answer seems to me to lie not in allowing
incompetent defendants to be processed through the criminal system, but in reforms in the
area of civil commitment.
5 Many of the uncertainties in this area stem from attempts to apply language in Fay
v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963), and Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443 (1965). In Fay, the
Supreme Court held that the failure to appeal a state conviction did not deprive the federal
courts of the power to grant habeas corpus relief. The Court, however, cautioned that a
"federal habeas judge may in his discretion deny relief to an applicant who has deliberately
bypassed the orderly procedure of the state courts and in so doing has forfeited his state court
remedies." 372 U.S. at 438. The Court quoted Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938),
for the proposition that the deliberate bypass must constitute "an intentional relinquishment
or abandonment of a known right or privilege" and stated that a decision "made by counsel
not participated in by the petitioner does not automatically bar relief." 372 U.S. at 439.
In Henry v. Mississippi, the defendant, charged with disturbing the peace, had been
convicted because his attorney had failed to make a contemporaneous objection to the intro-
duction of evidence seized in violation of the fourth amendment. The Court indicated that
access to a federal forum could be barred if there was a deliberate bypass of a state procedural
remedy. The Court remanded for a hearing on the bypass issue, stating that "trial strategy
adopted by counsel without prior consultation with an accused will not, where the circum-
stances are exceptional, preclude the accused from asserting constitutional claims." 379 U.S.
at 451. The cases seem able to support almost any result depending on whether a court fastens
on the "participation" language in Fay or the "exceptional circumstances" limitation in
Henry. See generally Chused, Faretta and the Personal Defense: The Role of a Represented
Defendant in Trial Tactics, 65 CAL. L. Rxv. 636, 639-41 (1977).
" Cross v. United States, 325 F.2d 626 (D.C. Cir. 1963). This is precisely the problem
with proceeding with an incompetent defendant-the defendant is only present physically.
See Foote, supra note 51, at 834.
-" Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 312 (1930), has often been cited for its strong
language warning the trial courts of the duty to make inquiry of the defendant before accept-
ing a waiver:
Not only must the right of the accused to a trial by a constitutional jury be jealously
preserved, but the maintenance of the jury as a fact finding body in criminal cases is of
such importance and has such a place in our traditions, that, before any waiver can
become effective, the consent of government counsel and the sanction of the court must
be had, in addition to the express and intelligent consent of the defendant. And the duty
of the trial court in that regard is not to be discharged as a mere matter of rote, but
with sound and advised discretion . ..
Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure requires a written waiver of a jury trial
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the traditional system of allocating to counsel the power to make
decisions of "trial strategy,""8 the thrust of the opinion is to reopen
the question of this traditional allocation. If a defendant has the
right to present his own defense, surely he should not be forced to
by the defendant and it has even been suggested that, in addition to the signing of the waiver
form, trial judges would be well advised to question the defendant directly. See United States
v. David, 511 F.2d 355, 360-61 (D.C.Cir. 1975); Estrada v. United States, 457 F.2d 255 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 858 (1972).
Of course the waiver of a jury trial should also be part of the court's inquiry in accepting
a guilty plea from a defendant. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243-44 (1969).
-" In a footnote in Faretta the Court stated:
This Court has often recognized the constitutional stature of rights that, though not
literally expressed in the document, are essential to due process of law in a fair adversary
process. It is now accepted, for example, that an accused has a right. . . to testify on
his own behalf, see Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225; Brooks v. Tennessee,. 406
U.S. 605, 612 ....
422 U.S. at 819 n.15.
The Court's footnote attempts to put to rest the uncertainty in federal courts over the
source and nature of the right to testify. Compare this footnote in Faretta with United States
v. Ives, 504 F.2d 935, 939-40 (9th Cir. 1974), vacated on other grounds, 421 U.S. 944 (1975),
and United States v. Bentvena, 319 F.2d 916 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S 940 (1963).
In United States ex rel. Wilcox v. Johnson, 555 F.2d 115 (3d Cir. 1977), the question of
control over the right to testify arose in a Pennsylvania rape case where the defendant Wilcox
wished to testify over his counsel's objection that his testimony would undercut the consent
defense she intended to raise. The court informed Wilcox that if he testified, the court would
permit defense counsel to withdraw. On a petition for a writ of habeas corpus the District
Court granted the writ, concluding that Wilcox had a constitutional right to testify under the
due process clause which only he could waive and that the trial court's ruling impinged upon
that right by forcing the defendant to decide whether to give up his right to counsel. On
appeal, the Third Circuit carefully reviewed the case law in the area, concluding that the
District Court's pronouncement of a defendant's constitutional right to testify "fairly reflects
the recognition of such a right by the federal courts." Id. at 119. But the court went on to
note that there was a statutory right to testify under Pennsylvania law and based its decision
on the state right, ruling that it was improper for the court to condition the right to counsel
on waiver of the state right to testify. Id. at 120-21.
As Wilcox demonstrates, once it is admitted that the defendant has a right to testify
despite the wishes of counsel, it gives the defendant great control over the defense to be
presented, for certainly counsel cannot put on a defense that is inconsistent with the defen-
dant's testimony.
For another type of decision out of which a dispute over control could develop, see United
States v. Bridgeman, 523 F.2d 1099, 1118-19 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 961 (1976)
(dispute between counsel and the defendant over the witnesses to be called at trial).
11 422 U.S. at 832-35. As indicated, the traditional allocation is not clear. The ABA
Standards for the Defense Function provide that the decisions over which plea to enter,
whether to waive a jury and whether to testify are to be made by the accused after full
consultation with counsel. ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE, THE DEFENSE FUNCTION § 5.2(a) (1971). Decisions over what witnesses to call, whether
and how to conduct cross-examinations, what jurors to accept or strike, what trial motions
should be made, and "all other strategic and tactical decisions" are "the exclusive province
of the lawyer after consultation" with the accused. Id. § 5.2(b). The comments following these
standards suggest, however, that the line is not nearly as clear as these standards indicate
and, with regard to the defendant's decisions, the comment notes that "other significant
decisions fall into a gray zone."
The University of Chicago Law Review
give up this right simply because he has asked for the assistance of
counsel." But whatever the exact allocation of responsibility, coun-
sel remains, as the Court said in Faretta, "an assistant" and "an
assistant, however expert, is still an assistant.""0
Aside from the constitutional restrictions, there are strong rea-
sons in policy for requiring defense counsel to raise the competency
issue. Experience with plea bargaining suggests that one ought to
be skeptical of the notion that counsel will always act in the client's
best interests. One study of plea bargaining concluded that because
of the strong pressures that the system of plea bargaining places on
defense attorneys, plea negotiations do not always result in an in-
formed choice by the defendant despite the assistance of counsel
and that "[f]ar from safeguarding the fairness of the plea negotia-
tions, the defense attorney is himself a frequent source of abuse."'"
If, under our system, a competent defendant has little control over
his attorney and the disposition of his case, the view that counsel
should be permitted to proceed at his discretion with an incompe-
tent client is upsetting indeed. 2
C. The Prosecutor
Section 4244 imposes a duty upon the United States Attorney
to raise the issue of competency whenever he has "reasonable cause
to believe" that a defendant "may be" incompetent.13 It is not clear
from the legislative history of section 4244 whether this provision
was viewed as imposing a new duty on federal prosecutors or
whether it was simply intended to codify a responsibility that had
1, It has been argued that Faretta should be read to undercut the traditional bar against
mixed representation and that the defendant should be able to waive counsel for certain
aspects of the trial while retaining counsel to conduct other aspects of the trial. See Chused,
Faretta and the Personal Defense: The Role of a Represented Defendant in Trial Tactics, 65
CALIF. L. REV. 636 (1977).
60 422 U.S. at 820. One of the few articles on competency that even suggests that counsel
may have an obligation to raise competency is Chernoff & Schaffer, Defending the Mentally
Ill: Ethical Quicksand, 10 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 505, 515-20 (1972). The authors take a far more
expansive view of the role of counsel than that argued in this article. They view the attorney
who hesitates to raise the issue because it is contrary to his client's interests as placed in an
ethical dilemma between his obligation to the court and his professional duty to represent
his client effectively. Id. at 519.
1, Alschuler, The Defense Attorney's Role in Plea Bargaining, 84 YALE L.J. 1179, 1313
(1975). See also A. RosETr & D. CRESSEY, JUSTICE BY CONSENT: PLEA BARGAINS IN THE AMERICAN
COURTHOUSE 137-43 (1976); Comment, In Search of the Adversary System-The Cooperative
Practices of Private Criminal Defense Attorneys, 50 TEX. L. REv. 60, 112-13 (1971).
62 As Bishop noted almost one hundred years ago, "Present insanity implies a disability
to employ, control, or discharge counsel." 2 J. BISHOP, CRIMINAL PROCEDIpiE § 666--3d- ed.
1880).
'18 U.S.C. § 4244 (1970).
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existed at common law."4 Certainly the common law allowed others
to raise the issue,65 but whether the prosecutor had a specific duty
to raise the issue is not clear.
Today, in the wake of several Supreme Court decisions6 hold-
ing that due process requires the prosecutor to bear responsibility
for the fairness of the trial, a strong argument can be made that the
prosecutor is under a duty, quite apart from section 4244, to raise
the issue of competency. In United States v. Agurs,7 the Court
reaffirmed its position that a prosecutor violates his constitutional
duty of disclosure under the due process clause of the fifth amend-
ment when he fails to turn over exculpatory evidence, and that
failure "is of sufficient significance to result in a denial of the defen-
dant's right to a fair trial." 6 The standard set by the Court in Agurs
for determining the significance of the undisclosed evidence is
whether such evidence, in the context of the entire record, creates
a reasonable doubt of guilt.
The failure to raise competency, however, presents a somewhat
different problem from that presented in Agurs and the other
failure-to-disclose cases. First, evidence suggesting a serious compe-
tency problem may not be exculpatory; it may have very little to
do with the crime. Second, cases such as °ady.& MaryLn 70 re-
quire the prosecutor to turn over exculpatory evidence, not to the
court, but to the defense. By contrast the issue presented in relation
to competency is whether the prosecutor must bring evidence of
incompetency to the attention of the court. Should a prosecutor who
has evidence of the defendant's incompetency have an obligation to
raise competency even though that evidence is also in the possession
of defense counsel?
The answer lies partly in one's view of the responsibility of the
defense attorney when faced with a competency problem. If raising
competency is viewed as a tactical move, then the prosecutor's obli-
gation might be viewed as running only to defense counsel. On the
other hand, if, as I have argued, defense counsel has an obligation
" Judge Magruder indicated that the provision "makes it more the specific duty of the
Attorney General, and in the first instance of the United States Attorney, to bring this matter
to the attention of the judge." Hearings, supra note 18, at 4.
" Bishop indicated that it was open even to "third persons" to raise the issue. See text
and note at note 6 supra.
a E.g., United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 86-
88 (1963).
427 U.S. 97 (1976).
Id. at 108.
" Id. at 108, 112-13.
' 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
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to raise competency as part of a duty to protect his client's constitu-
tional rights, no matter what the practical disadvantages a finding
of incompetency might entail, then the prosecutor ought to have the
same obligation in order to assure the fairness of the trial. The
withholding of evidence going to the defendant's competency af-
fects the fairness of the trial in a more fundamental sense than the
withholding of exculpatory evidence. The government should not
be permitted to explain its failure to raise competency by pointing
to defense counsel's failure to raise the issue. In Evans v. Kropp,7 1
a district court held that the prosecutor's failure to present evi-
dence of incompetency to the trial judge prior to the acceptance of
a guilty plea violated due process. The court indicated that the
prosecutor had a duty to inform the court of such information. In
the same opinion, the court further suggested that defense counsel's
failure to raise the issue was tantamount to ineffective assistance of
counsel, whether or not counsel viewed a finding of incompetency
as favorable to his client.72
Cases such as Robinson, Drope, and even Youtsey, imply that
if defense counsel fails to raise competency, it is nonetheless the
court's obligation to raise and resolve the issue. By staunchly refus-
ing to allow a remand in Drope for a retrospective determination of
competency where the trial court failed to hold a hearing, the Su-
preme Court seems to be indicating a certain impatience with courts
that fail to take control of the issue at the proper time.73 When one
11 254 F. Supp. 218 (E.D. Mich. 1966) (McCree, J.).
72 But see Ashley v. Texas, 319 F.2d 80 (5th Cir. 1963), where the court held that the
prosecutor violated due process by failing to inform defense counsel of information which
suggested a competency problem. The information was viewed as a matter for the tactical
use of counsel in planning a defense. Id. at 85.
73 The Supreme Court in Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960), reversed the
defendant's conviction because the district judge had used an improper standard to deter-
mine competency. In reversing and ordering a new trial the Court cited the "difficulties of
retrospectively determining the petitioner's competency as of more than a year ago." Id. at
403. In Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 387 (1966), the Court also reversed, calling attention
to the "need for concurrent determination" of the competency issue which the Court felt
distinguished the case from Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964). Finally, in Drope v.
Missouri, 420 U.S. 162 (1975), the "inherent difficulties of. . . a nunc pro tunc determination
under the most favorable circumstances" were cited as the reason for refusing to remand to
determine whether the petitioner had been competent at the time of his trial. 420 U.S. at
183. It seems more likely that the refusal to remand to allow the court to determine whether
the defendant's prior competency can now be meaningfully determined is the Court's way of
emphasizing the importance of the issue. The Court's actual justification for the refusal to
remand makes little sense, since the "inherent difficulties" have not stopped a nunc pro tunc
determination of the defendant's sanity at the time of the offense. In these cases there was a
full trial and there may well be many reliable witnesses who observed the defendant or talked
to him and who could offer testimony as to the defendant's mental abilities at trial.
The Court's remarks on the "inherent difficulties" of nunc pro tunc determinations of
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tion. 9 Indeed, there may be very little relationship between a defen-
dant's competency to stand trial and his criminal responsibility for
the crime. A defendant may be seriously psychotic and not legally
responsible for committing the crime and.yet be fully able to under-
stand the trial and assist in his defense .1 Moreover, competency is
often determined on the basis of a single interview,8' while an exami-
nation into sanity at the time of the offense will involve far more
testing, more interviewing or analysis, and more observation and
evaluation than the competency inquiry.2 Thus an examination
into competency is an insufficient basis for making a determination
of the defendant's criminal responsibility for the crime. 83
A. Dual Purpose Examinations
It is a common federal practice to order a "dual purpose exami-
nation" whenever competency is raised. This permits a psychiatrist
to examine the defendant for the purpose of determining both his
competency to stand trial and his sanity at the time of the offense. 84
,' See, e.g., Warren v. United States, 488 F.2d 862 (5th Cir. 1974).
N See United States v. Walker, 537 F.2d 1192 (4th Cir. 1976); United States v. Mercado,
469 F.2d 1148 (2d Cir. 1972).
A, In many cases the interview on which the psychiatrist based his opinion was less than
an hour. See, e.g., United States v. David, 511 F.2d 355, 359 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (30 minute
interview); United States v. Taylor, 437 F.2d 371 (4th Cir. 1971) (10 minutes). Studies
indicate that most examinations into competency could be conducted on an outpatient basis.
See note 97 infra.
" See note 76 supra.
'" Winn v. United States, 270 F.2d 326 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
" There are no federal statistics on the exact scope of each examination because compe-
tency examinations are carried out not only at the Medical Center for Federal Prisoners in
Springfield, Missouri, see, e.g., United States v. Fortune, 513 F.2d 883, 885 (5th Cir. 1975),
but also by private psychiatrists at local private clinics, see, e.g., United States v. DiGilio,
538 F.2d 972, 986 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied sub nom. Lupo v. United States, 429 U.S. 1038
(1977), or at local government facilities, see, e.g., United States v. Reifsteck, 535 F.2d 1030,
1032 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v. Smith, 404 F.2d 720, 721-22 (6th Cir. 1968), and even
in the defendant's cell, see, e.g., United States v. Taylor, 437 F.2d 371, 374 (4th Cir. 1971).
Even the order that was entered is not always an indication of the nature of the examination
carried out. See text at note 102 infra. But it is fairly easy to infer that dual purpose exami-
nations are very common. In the first place, the statistics that do exist suggest that dual
purpose examinations are the customary practice. See D.C. STUDY, supra note 10, at 80.
Secondly, the practice of ordering dual purpose examinations has been consistently and
repeatedly upheld by a number of circuits. See, e.g., United States v. Jines, 536 F.2d 1255,
1256 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 942 (1976); United States v. Wade, 489 F.2d 258 (9th
Cir. 1973); United States v. Julian, 469 F.2d 371, 375-76 (10th Cir. 1972); United States v.
Moudy, 462 F.2d 694, 697 (5th Cir. 1972). Thirdly, although the rationale for enlarging the
scope of the competency examination to include criminal responsibility is that such an
examination will provide economies of court time and medical effort, see text and note at
note 94 infra, there has never been a requirement that there be a showing of any kind in
order to obtain a dual purpose examination; it appears that courts are simply ordering such
examinations routinely. In Winn v. United States, 270 F.2d 326 (D.C. Cir. 1959), Judge
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examines the Brady line of cases and the Court's attitude toward
trial courts on the competency issue, it is evident that the Court
would take a dim view of a prosecutor who had information raising
a serious competency question but who failed to bring it to the
attention of the trial court, regardless of whether such information
was in the hands of defense counsel.
The source of the prosecutor's duty to disclose could be of great
importance to the defendant. If the prosecutor's duty is statutory
only, remedies for its breach need not necessarily take the form of
vacating judgment. Criminal defendants are afforded more certain
protection if breach of the duty is viewed as a denial of due process.
I. THE PSYCHIATRIC EXAMINATION AND ITS ABUSE
Section 4244 provides that the court shall order a psychiatric
examination once a motion raising the question of competency has
been filed. Unless the motion is made in bad faith or is patently
frivolous the court must order this examination.7 4 No preliminary
inquiry into the defendant's competency is permitted. 75
As might be expected, the psychiatric examination into a de-
fendant's competency to stand trial differs greatly from the exami-
nation into the defendant's criminal responsibility at the time of the
offense. 7 Different issues are at stake in the two inquiries.7 7 Unlike
the insanity inquiry, nothing in the competency determination
turns on the presence or absence of "a mental disease or defect."
Instead, courts deal in a case by case fashion with the functional
problems arising from, for example, amnesia 7 8 and even drug addic-
competency have understandably led to some confusion in the circuits. The Fifth Circuit has
remanded in certain cases where a hearing should have been held, leaving it up to the trial
court to determine if an adequate and meaningful hearing into the defendant's prior compe-
tency is possible. See United States v. Makris, 483 F.2d 1082 (5th Cir. 1973); United States
v. McEachern, 465 F.2d 833 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1043 (1972). The Ninth Circuit
has indicated that such a remand is not appropriate. United States v. Irvin, 450 F.2d 968 (9th
Cir. 1971).
71 Harkins v. Wyrick, 552 F.2d 1308, 1311 n.2 (8th Cir. 1977); United States v. Johnson,
527 F.2d. 1104, 1106 (4th Cir. 1975). This may be a matter of constitutional dimension. See
text and notes at notes 163-164 infra.
11 Rose v. United States, 513 F.2d 1251, 1255 (8th Cir. 1975); United States v. McEach-
ern, 465 F.2d 833, 837 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1043 (1972).
78 See, e.g., United States v. Walker, 537 F.2d 1192 (4th Cir. 1976); Winn v. United
States, 270 F.2d 326 (D.C. Cir. 1959); Blunt v. United States, 244 F.2d 355, 364 n.23 (D.C.
Cir. 1957).
7 See text and notes at notes 12-16 supra.
76 In Wilson v. United States, 391 F.2d 460 (D.C. Cir. 1968), the defendant's amnesia
was caused by the crash of the getaway car in which he was riding. See also United States ex
rel. Parson v. Anderson, 481 F.2d 94 (3d Cir. 1973); United States v. Stevens, 461 F.2d 317
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 948 (1972).
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Originally courts turned to section 4244 as authority for ordering
dual purpose examinations, but in recent years many of the circuits
have come to accept the position that section 4244 is concerned only
with competency. 5 Considering the plain language of that section
and the legislative history, the conclusion is inescapable that the
legislators were concerned only with the problem of competency to
stand trial.88 As section 4244 has been discarded as authority for
dual purpose examinations, courts have turned to their "inherent
power" for the authority to expand the competency examination to
cover insanity. 7 The question, however, is not the power of the
federal courts to order such examinations; long before section 4244
was passed, federal courts exercised the power to order psychiatric
exams. The question is whether dual purpose exams are consistent
with the defendant's constitutional rights and, even if they are,
whether there are policy reasons against linking the insanity exami-
nation with the procedures for determining competency.
The defendant clearly receives no benefit from a dual purpose
exam. Even if the defendant is indigent he can obtain his own
psychiatric expert to provide those services "necessary to an ade-
quate defense" pursuant to section 3006A(e) of title 18 of the United
States Code.8 Section 3006A(e) contemplates a broad range of assis-
tance including, but not limited to, expert testimony.89 Such an
expert is available to help counsel evaluate possible defenses, and
his conclusions need not be reported to the court or the prosecu-
tion. The section 3006A(e) psychiatrist is, in a sense, part of the
defense team.
There is no doubt that the main beneficiary of a dual purpose
exam is the government,8" which employs the examination for dis-
Bazelon suggested that a prosecutor ought always to see that a dual purpose examination is
conducted. Id. at 327-28.
11 See, e.g., United States v. Jines, 536 F.2d 1255, 1256 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
942 (1976); United States v. Malcolm, 475 F.2d 420, 424 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v.
Moudy, 462 F.2d 694, 697 (5th Cir. 1972).
' See United States v. Alvarez, 519 F.2d 1036, 1042-44 (3d Cir. 1975). This case contains
the best analysis of § 4244 and its background.
" See, e.g., United States v. Jines, 536 F.2d 1255, 1256 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
942 (1976); United States v. Wade, 489 F.2d 258, 259 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v. Moudy,
462 F.2d 694 (5th Cir. 1972); Winn v. United States, 270 F.2d 326 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
" United States v. Chavis, 476 F.2d 1137, 1141 (D.C. Cir. 1973); United States v. Taylor,
437 F.2d 371, 377 (4th Cir. 1971).
As See United States v. Caldwell, 543 F.2d 1333, 1350 (D.C. Cir. 1974); United States v.
Taylor, 437 F.2d 371, 377 (4th Cir. 1971).
" United States v. Theriault, 440 F.2d 713, 715 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 411 U.S.
984 (1973). See also United States v. Alvarez, 519 F.2d 1036 (3d Cir. 1975) (privilege exists
between defendant and his psychiatric expert).
11 See text and notes at notes 93-94 infra.
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covery purposes. One cannot read current federal cases on insanity
without being struck by the fact that, in case after case, the psychi-
atric expert called by the government to rebut the insanity defense
is the same psychiatrist who was orginally employed to determine
the defendant's competency to stand trial.
92
Courts have on occasion frankly admitted that it is the govern-
ment that benefits from dual purpose examinations. The Fifth Cir-
cuit in United States v. Moudy"3 upheld a dual purpose exam or-
dered sua sponte by the trial court, and seemed to acknowledge that
the purpose of such exams is government discovery:
In a sense, the discretion to enlarge the examination does, as
appellant points out, expose him to the possibility of bolstering
the government's case. But, in the end, all concerned-court,
counsel, and parties-have an interest in determining if the
accused was incompetent at the time of the offense, if that is
to be an issue, and we see no prejudice in the court's ordering
that said determination be made sooner rather than later and
at a time when the determination is least likely to delay a
trial. 4
The court's rationale is surely a weak one. Whether or not the prose-
cution and defense have the same "interest" in determining if the
defendant was insane at the time of the offense, they certainly do
not have the same burden of proof. 5 Yet the case stands as one of
very few in which a federal court has given the practice of dual
purpose exams other than the most cursory review.96
It is somewhat surprising that dual purpose examinations are
routinely ordered without any showing of necessity, particularly in
view of the consequences such an examination may have for the
92 See, e.g., United States v. Reifsteck, 535 F.2d 1030 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v.
Alvarez, 519 F.2d 1036 (3d Cir. 1975); United States v. McCracken, 488 F.2d 406 (5th Cir.
1974); United States v. Mattson, 469 F.2d 1234 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 986
(1973); United States v. Bennett, 460 F.2d 872 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
,3 462 F.2d 694 (5th Cir. 1972).
"1 Id. at 697.
Is In federal prosecutions, once a reasonable doubt of a defendant's sanity has been
raised, the government has the burden of proving sanity. Davis v. United States, 160 U.S.
469 (1895). The only exceptions are prosecutions in the District of Columbia for which Con-
gress in 1970 placed the burden of proving insanity on the defendant, by a preponderance of
the evidence. 24 D.C. CODE § 301(0) (1973). The District of Columbia Circuit has upheld the
constitutionality of this statute. United States v. Greene, 489 F.2d 1145, 1153-56 (D.C. Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 977 (1974). Exceptions such as this statute are permissible
because, as the Supreme Court recently emphasized, Davis is not a constitutional ruling.
Patterson v. New York, 97 S. Ct. 2319, 2323 (1977).
" But see United States v. Alvarez, 519 F.2d 1036 (3d Cir. 1975).
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defendant's liberty. A competency examination can usually be per-
formed on an outpatient basis, 7 and should be conducted in a way
that is least restrictive of the defendant's liberty."8 Since an exami-
nation into sanity may require hospitalization for a substantial pe-
riod of time, often amounting to several weeks," it is hardly unrea-
sonable to require a showing of need before forcing a defendant to
submit to a dual purpose examination when only questions of com-
petency have been raised.
In any individual case a dual purpose order will achieve some
savings in court time and will avoid the possible duplication of
medical efforts if the defendant later raises the issue of his sanity
at the time of the offense. However, studies indicate that of the
numbers of defendants about whom there is a competency question,
only a very small percentage will later raise an insanity defense.100
There is no dispute that competency questions are raised far more
often than insanity. 01 Thus, in routinely ordering dual purpose
exams whenever competency is raised, courts are achieving a largely
imaginary economy at great expense to defendants' liberties.
B. The Problem of Notification: United States v. Driscoll
One of the more serious problems with the current practice of
ordering dual purpose examinations is the failure of the courts to
give notice to defendant and his counsel of the fact that the exami-
nation will have any purpose other than determination of the defen-
dant's competency to stand trial. Even if defense counsel made the
original motion for a competency examination, counsel may be una-
'1 D.C. STUDY, supra note 10, at 81. Studies have suggested that 70% of the evaluations
on competency can be performed adequately on an outpatient basis. D. WEXLER, CRIMINAL
COMMITMENTS AND DANGEROUS MENrAL PATIENTS: LEGAL ISSUES OF CONFINEMENT, TREATmENT,
AND RELEASE 71 (DHEW Publ. No. (ADM) 76-331 (1976)). The Massachusetts Study has
urged that all competency examinations should initially be done on an outpatient basis with
observational admissions only if such examinations prove inadequate. MASSACHUSErs STUDY,
supra note 38, at 65.
98 See generally Kaufman, Evaluating Competency: Are Constitutional Deprivations
Necessary? 10 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 465, 473-77 (1972).
Several years ago the D.C. Circuit ruled that the defendant's competency should be
determined on an outpatient basis when it has been requested unless it is shown that commit-
ment is necessary for a proper diagnosis. Marcey v. Harris, 400 F.2d 772, 774 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
The case has apparently had little effect, for it appears that St. Elizabeth's Hospital, which
does most of the examinations in the District, is still not equipped to provide other than
inpatient examinations. See United States v. Henry, 528 F.2d 661, 663 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
" The commitment period for such examinations often runs as long as 60 to 90 days. See
D.C. STUDY, supra note 10, at 29-30.
'0 See MASSACHUSETTS STUDY, supra note 38, at iii.
1, Id.
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ware that courts, in response to such a motion, commonly order a
dual purpose examination. 2 The problem is not always the fault of
defense counsel. Often the order that is entered does not indicate
the exact scope of the examination.
In United States v. Driscoll, "I the Second Circuit seemed to
announce a notification rule. The trial court in that case ordered an
examination into the competency of a defendant on trial for tax
evasion. The order did not specify that the psychiatric examination
would encompass both the issue of competency and the issue of
criminal responsibility, but indicated only that a competency exam-
ination was to be conducted. 04 The defendant was subsequently
found competent, and the trial was commenced. At trial, the psy-
chiatrist who had examined the defendant on the issue of compe-
tency testified for the government to rebut the defendant's claim
that he was either insane, or, if not insane, then at least unable to
entertain the wilfulness requisite to criminal liability.' 5 In an opin-
ion that carefully skirted constitutional questions, the Second Cir-
cuit, in its supervisory capacity, reversed, holding that it was unfair
to use the psychiatrist's testimony against the defendant at trial
without giving adequate notice of that possibility prior to the exami-
nation.' The court stated: "We do not believe that a defendant can
be told that he is to be examined for one purpose and, once his
cooperation has been obtained, be advised of another."'0 7
What is surprising about Driscoll is the narrowness of the hold-
ing. When a court order specifies one purpose for the examination,
it would seem to be a violation of due process to permit the govern-
ment, without notice to either counsel or the defendant, to obtain
discovery on other issues. The Driscoll court pointed out that if
counsel had been given notice of the dual purpose of the examina-
tion, he might have sought certain procedural protections, such as
the presence of counsel or taping of the examination. 8 Although the
federal courts have consistently held that a defendant has no right
to counsel at these examinations, 09 the rationale underlying a right
1o2 See, e.g., United States v. Malcolm, 475 F.2d 420, 422 (9th Cir. 1973).
"o 399 F.2d 135 (2d Cir. 1968).
1o0 Id. at 137.
105 Id. at 136-37.
108 Id. at 138.
" Id. at 137.
200 Id. at 138.
'" United States v. Mattson, 469 F.2d 1234, 1236 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S.
986 (1973); United States ex rel. Stukes v. Shovlin, 464 F.2d 1211, 1213 (3d Cir. 1972); United
States v. Smith, 436 F.2d 787, 790 (5th Cir. 1971). In Lee v. County Court, 27 N.Y.2d 432,
267 N.E.2d 452, 318 N.Y.S.2d 705, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 823 (1971), the New York Court of
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to notice in these situations is not that counsel, if notified, could
have prevented the examination or attended it. The main concern
is that counsel should be entitled to explain to his client the nature
of the examination and its possible legal consequences. When the
order misleads counsel, it places him in the position of misrepre-
senting the nature of the examination to his client.110 To force a
defendant, who may be emotionally unstable, to submit to a more
intensive and probing mental examination, without warning to de-
fense counsel, is troubling, particularly when the examination may
produce adverse psychological consequences.'11
Even though Driscoll was only a very cautious step in the direc-
tion of controlling the use of dual purpose examinations, the Second
Circuit, only nine months later, expressed some dissatisfaction with
the case."' Two circuits have specifically rejected Driscoll,"3 and it
appears that Driscoll remains good law only in the Third Circuit."4
C. Self-Incrimination Problems: Statutory and Constitutional
The Driscoll court appeared to hold it reversible error to permit
the psychiatrist who examined a defendant on the issue of compe-
tency to testify at trial against the defendant on the issue of insan-
ity, if the court failed to notify the defendant that the competency
examination would be used to gather trial evidence. In United
States v. Alvarez,"15 the Third Circuit suggested that the use of
Appeals ruled that the defendant had the right to the presence of counsel to act as an
observer. Id. at 444, 267 N.E.2d at 458-59, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 714-15.
"I0 The court in Driscoll stated that the "defendant was entitled to notice so that he could
consult with counsel beforehand and thereafter fully and intelligently respond to the doctor's
questions." 399 F.2d at 138.
" See Smith, Psychiatric Examinations-Federal Mental Competency Proceedings, 37
F.R.D. 111 (1964).
"' In United States v. Matos, 409 F.2d 1245 (2d Cir. 1969), the court refused to extend
Driscoll to condemn the government's use of evidence based on a psychiatric examination
conducted by state and city officials for purposes unrelated to the federal prosecution. Defen-
dant claimed that Driscoll barred the use of the psychiatric evidence because he had not been
warned at the time of the examination that it might be used against him on the issue of sanity
at trial. The court declared that Driscoll "should be limited strictly to its own facts." Id. at
1247 n.2. The remark is somewhat cryptic. On the one hand, the court may simply have
meant that Driscoll only mandates notification in dual purpose competency examination
cases. On the other hand, the court may have meant that Driscoll presented an extraordinary
case of deceit by the government that warranted extraordinary relief. The court distinguished
the Matos case from Driscoll on the grounds that Matos presented "no element of deceit or
unfairness such as would warrant excluding the psychiatric testimony in this case." Id. at
1247.
1 3 United States v. Mattson, 469 F.2d 1234 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 986
(1973); United States v. Jacquillon, 469 F.2d 380 (5th Cir. 1972).
"I See United States v. Alvarez, 519 F.2d 1036, 1044 (3d Cir. 1975).
I's 519 F.2d 1036 (3d Cir. 1975).
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statements made by a defendant during the course of a psychiatric
examination conducted pursuant to section 4244 would raise "a fifth
amendment problem of no little difficulty." '
In Alvarez, a defendant charged with kidnapping raised the
question of competency, was examined pursuant to section 4244,
and was found competent to stand trial. At trial, the psychiatrist
who examined the defendant on the competency question was called
to testify in rebuttal to the defendant's insanity defense. The court
of appeals noted that the psychiatrist, "clearly the most effective
government witness on that issue,"'1" 7 recounted statements by the
defendant that, while denying involvement in the crime, indicated
that "he knows that it was wrong." ' Without deciding whether
courts possessed the "inherent power" to compel psychiatric exami-
nations on the insanity issue, the Third Circuit recognized that the
use on the insanity issue of statements elicited at the competency
examination raises fifth amendment problems. Previous cases in the
circuit had ruled that "at least where any statement elicited in the
examination tends to establish the fact of the offense or the volun-
tariness of other statements by the accused, [it] is a violation of
the privilege against self-incrimination.""' 9 In light of these preced-
ents, the court in Alvarez concluded that "it would be quite difficult
to hold that statements elicited in a compelled psychiatric examina-
tion could be used to establish sanity, and thus guilt."' 20 The court
avoided the constitutional issue, however, and reversed on statutory
grounds, ruling that section 4244's bar against the use of statements
made by the accused at the competency examination "on the issue
of guilt in any criminal proceeding"12' forecloses the use of such
statements on the issue of sanity at trial.
As the Alvarez court noted, section 4244 was drafted in such a
" Id. at 1041.
17 Id.
Id.
11 Id. at 1042.
1 Id. The Third Circuit in Government of the Virgin Islands v. Bellott, 495 F.2d 1393
(3d Cir. 1974), held that sanity is an issue concerning guilt and thus is an issue which the
government bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt.
121 The statute provides, in relevant part:
No statement made by the accused in the course of any examination into his sanity or
mental competency provided for by this section, whether the examination shall be with
or without the consent of the accused, shall be admitted in evidence against the accused
on the issue of guilt in any criminal proceeding.
18 U.S.C. § 4244 (1970).
The D.C. statute on competency has no such exclusionary provision, but the D.C. Circuit
has held that the § 4244 prohibition applies to examinations carried out under 24 D.C. CODE
§ 301 (1973). See United States v. Bennett, 460 F.2d 872, 878 n.22 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
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way as to avoid fifth amendment problems. In addition to the provi-
sion against admission of the defendant's statements in the compe-
tency examination, section 4244 provides that a finding of compe-
tency "shall in no way prejudice the accused in a plea of insanity
as a defense to the crime charged; such a finding shall not be intro-
duced in evidence on that issue nor otherwise be brought to the
notice of the jury."'' 22 This language was added to the proposed
section 4244 by the Senate Judiciary Committee 23 just prior to pas-
sage in order "to give adequate assurance to an accused person that
his right to plead insanity will be protected." 24 Far from authorizing
a new method for facilitating government discovery, the thrust of
these amendments to section 4244 was to avoid fifth amendment
difficulties and protect the defendant's trial options.
Section 4244, however, does not in terms bar the psychiatrist
from testifying at trial against the defendant on the issues of insan-
ity or mens rea. In United States v. Malcolm, 25 the Ninth Circuit
relied on the absence of such a specific prohibition to reject the
defendant's argument that permitting the psychiatrist to testify at
trial violated section 4244. The court stated:
Congress could have resolved the matter by forbidding the ex-
amining psychiatrist from testifying at the trial on the merits,
but it did not do so. It chose instead to frame the limitation in
terms of statements made by the accused. If the examining
psychiatrist does not testify to the statements by the accused,
his testimony is not foreclosed by § 4244.126
The Malcolm rationale is questionable in two respects. First,
'- 18 U.S.C. § 4244 (1970). With regard to this provision that a finding of incompetency
shall not be introduced or otherwise "brought to the notice of the jury," the courts have faced
problems of interpretation because often it becomes evident that the psychiatrist was origi-
nally appointed by the court to examine both competency and insanity. See, e.g., United
States v. Harper, 450 F.2d 1032, 1035-36 (5th Cir. 1971). The provision has now been narrowly
interpreted so as to bar only the admission of the court's finding of competency. Id. Even
though such a finding by the court would be clearly implied, courts have permitted psychia-
trists to mention the nature of their appointment and even allowed into evidence on the sanity
issue psychiatric reports which concluded that the defendant is competent. See United States
v. Hereden, 464 F.2d 611 (5th Cir. 1972); United States v. Harper, 450 F.2d 1032 (5th Cir.
1971).
123 Judge Calvert Magruder was the main witness at the Senate Judiciary Committee
hearing on the bill. The Committee Chairman Alexander Wiley showed an impressive knowl-
edge of the general law in the area and he pressed Judge Magruder on a number of procedural
points. See Hearings, supra note 18, at 4-11.
121 CARE AND CUSTODY OF INSANE FEDERAL PRISONERS, S. REP. No. 1511, 80th Cong., 2d
Sess. 1 (1948).
'= 475 F.2d 420 (9th Cir. 1973).
'' Id. at 426.
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section 4244 was drafted to allow an examination dealing only with
competency. As long as the examination was limited to competency,
there was no reason for Congress to be concerned about the use of
the psychiatrist as an expert witness against the defendant on the
issue of insanity. One cannot fault Congress for failing to surround
with special protections an examination that was not intended to
fall within the scope of section 4244. Second, the court's notion
that 4244 only bars the introduction of defendant's statements
as such seems inaccurate. To contend that the psychiatrist may
testify freely at the trial on the basis of the defendant's compelled
statements ignores the spirit of the protections provided by sec-
tion 4244 and results in "prejudice" to the defendant's insanity
defense.
Whether or not dual purpose examinations are consistent with
section 4244, there remain the substantial fifth amendment prob-
lems alluded to by the Alvarez court. The question of the constitu-
tionality of compelled psychiatric examinations in connection with
criminal proceedings is unresolved in the federal courts, perhaps
due in part to the phenomenon of the dual purpose examination,
which has enabled the government to obtain discovery on insanity
questions in an indirect manner. '27 The fifth amendment basically
protects defendants in criminal trials from being compelled to tes-
tify against themselves. The Supreme Court has attempted to de-
fine the limits within which a defendant cannot be compelled to
cooperate by differentiating between testimonial evidence, which is
protected, and "real" or essentially physical evidence, which does
not fall within the privilege.' 28 Using this distinction, some courts
have suggested the psychiatric examinations do not raise fifth
amendment problems because they do not compel communications
at all but instead produce physical evidence like blood tests, line-
ups, handwriting exemplars, and voice identifications.' 2 However,
as one commentator noted, the notion that the psychiatrist seeks
"physical evidence" is belied by the fact that the usual examination
is designed to "discover certain types of ideas and thought processes
• . . by eliciting verbal, emotional and physical indications" of the
subject's ideas.
1 30
'2 See text at notes 93-94 supra.
12 See generally Lefelt, Pretrial Mental Examinations: Compelled Cooperation and the
Fifth Amendment, 10 Am. CraM. L. REv. 431, 434 (1972).
-n See, e.g., United States v. Cohen, 530 F.2d 43, 48 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v.
Handy, 454 F.2d 885, 889 (9th Cir. 1971).
'" See Note, Requiring a Criminal Defendant to Submit to a Government Psychiatric
Examination: An Invasion of the Privilege against Self Incrimination, 83 HAav. L. REv. 648,
655 (1970).
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Not only does a psychiatric examination elicit information that
seems closer to "testimonial" than real evidence, but the method of
conducting the examination also seems to conflict with the values
intended to be protected. Among the reasons for the privilege are
(1) the need to protect the defendant from possible inhuman treat-
ment; (2) the unreliability of compelled confessions; (3) respect for
the human dignity of the accused; (4) unwillingness to put an indi-
vidual to a choice between self-incrimination, perjury, or contempt;
and (5) a rejection of inquisitorial procedures.1 31 The psychiatric
examination seems to threaten many, if not all, of the values under-
lying the privilege. The possibility of inhuman treatment in the
form of psychological coercion, problems of reliability, 32 impinge-
ment on the defendant's innermost private thoughts, the tempta-
tion to feign insanity-all of these evils inhere in compelled psychi-
atric examinations.
The cases that have examined the problem have not recognized
these considerations and have simply offered a series of conclusory
and inconsistent justifications for upholding the use of testimony
based on compelled psychiatric examinations. It has been sug-
gested, for example, that compelled psychiatric examinations do
not raise fifth amendment problems so long as the psychiatrist
avoids repeating the defendant's statements, 33 or that compelled
psychiatric examinations do not raise fifth amendment problems
because the purpose of the exam is not to prove that the defendant
did the act, but to determine whether he "possesses the requisite
mentality to be guilty as charged .... ,,,3.
,' See id. at 656.
,22 A defendant who may be perfectly sane has the incentive to try to fool the psychiatrist
into believing he is insane, while one characteristic of the mentally ill is that they try to guard
against disclosing their illness. Id. at 658.
"3 See, e.g., United States v. Jines, 536 F.2d 1255 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 942
(1976).
"I United States v. Albright, 388 F.2d 719, 723 (4th Cir. 1968).
The Advisory Committee Note to FED. R. CRIM. P. 12.2 indicates that compelled psychi-
atric exams do not raise fifth amendment problems because "[any issue of self-
incrimination which might arise can be dealt with by the court as, for example, by a bifur-
cated trial which deals separately with the issue of guilt and of mental responsibility." But
this rests on the assumption that guilt and mental responsibility are separable issues-an
assumption which has been subjected to considerable attack. See generally Louisell & Haz-
ard, Insanity as a Defense: The Bifurcated Trial, 49 CALIF. L. Rav. 805 (1961). In State v.
Shaw, 106 Ariz. 103, 471 P.2d 715 (1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1009 (1971), the Arizona
Supreme Court held that the exclusion, at the trial on guilt, of evidence of partial impairment
which showed that the defendant was not capable of forming the intent required for the crime
violated due process-even though such evidence might be considered at the trial on insanity.
The court held that the Arizona bifurcated trial statute was unconstitutional because it
prevented the defendant from showing he did not have the requisite intent.
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All of the arguments advanced have a forced quality about
them and have been subject to much criticism in the extensive
literature on compelled psychiatric examinations and insanity.'
One view of the fifth amendment and compelled psychiatric exams
deserves discussion for it Seems to be the most common view and it
takes the most realistic approach to the problems involved. Accord-
ing to this view, when a defendant raises an insanity defense and
relies on experts to support that defense, the government is entitled
to have the defendant examined by its own experts in order to meet
the defense.' 36 The theory seems to be that, by opening himself to
his own experts and offering those experts at trial, the defendant
waives his fifth amendment privilege to resist a similar examination
by government experts.' 37 It is argued that the maintenance of a
"fair state-individual balance" permits such an examination be-
cause of the nature of the insanity defense; if the government is
required to prove sanity beyond a reasonable doubt, "it cannot be
denied access to the only reliable means of ascertaining the truth
concerning a defendant's sanity."'3
This theory appears to be embodied in rule 12.2 of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure. Rule 12.2 requires a defendant to give:
(a) notice of his intention to rely on the insanity defense, and (b)
notice of his intention to use expert testimony relating to mental
disease or mental state. The rule also authorizes the court to condi-
tion the defendant's use of expert testimony on his willingness to
submit to a psychiatric examination if the government moves for an
examination. "
Even if a defendant's intention to use expert testimony on is-
sues of insanity or mens rea can be deemed a "waiver" of the fifth
amendment privilege, there is nothing that triggers such a waiver
when competency questions are raised. While defense counsel may
have raised the question of competency, the court should not con-
" See, e.g., Note, Requiring a Criminal Defendant to Submit to a Government Psychiat-
ric Examination: An Invasion of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 83 HAlv. L. REv.
648 (1970). See also Danforth, Death Knell for Pre-Trial Mental Examination? Privilege
against Self-Incrimination. 19 Ru'rEs L. Rlv. 489 (1965).
,'3 See, e.g., Karstetter v. Caldwell, 526 F.2d 1144 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v. Baird,
414 F.2d 700, 710 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1005 (1970); United States v. Albright,
388 F.2d 719 (4th Cir. 1968); Alexander v. United States, 380 F.2d 33, 39 (8th Cir. 1967). The
leading case on this view is a state case, State v. Whitlow, 45 N.J. 3, 210 A.2d 763 (1965).
,31 The theory appears to be a waiver theory but it is not exactly clear. See United States
v. Malcolm, 475 F.2d 420, 425 (9th Cir. 1973). At times it appears in the form of an estoppel
argument. See, e.g., United States v. Weiser, 428 F.2d 932, 936 (2d Cir. 1969).
'" United States v. Albright, 388 F.2d 719, 724 (4th Cir. 1968).
'- FED. R. CRIM. P. 12.2.
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sider this to be an indication of the defendant's future trial strategy
with regard to raising and proving an insanity defense. "' Moreover,
for a court to interpret the motion for a competency hearing as a
waiver would seem to ignore the fact that what is being raised is the
present ability or inability of the defendant either to assert or to
waive his rights.
The fundamental constitutional problem does not, of course,
inhere in dual purpose examinations as such, but in compelled psy-
chiatric examinations.' The consistency of such examinations with
the privilege against self-incrimination is not at all clear, compli-
cated as the issue is by questions concerning the uses of expert
psychiatric testimony in federal courts' and the role of trial courts
in raising the insanity defense sua sponte. "I The difficulties are only
compounded when the competency examination is used for discov-
ery purposes.
, See text and note at note 94 supra.
"' The use of dual purpose examinations may, however, raise more serious fifth amend-
ment problems than the compulsion of psychiatric examinations pursuant to rule 12.2. Rule
12.2 does not authorize courts to order examinations on the sanity issue. Rather it permits
the court to condition defendant's use of expert testimony upon his submission to examina-
tion by the prosecution's experts. This has been upheld as a permissible burden on the
privilege against self-incrimination. Karstetter v. Caldwell, 526 F.2d 1144 (9th Cir. 1975);
Alexander v. United States, 380 F.2d 33 (8th Cir. 1967). Under § 4244, however, the accused
has no choice but to submit. The competency examination is to be conducted "with or
without the consent of the accused." 18 U.S.C. § 4244 (1970). If the competency examination
is dual purpose, the privilege is not merely burdened, it is denied.
"I The admissibility of expert testimony upon the issue of mens rea in federal courts is
unclear. See Advisory Committee Note to FED. R. CiuM. P. 12.2, 62 F.R.D. 295-98 (1974).
Compare Rhodes v. United States, 282 F.2d 59, 62 (4th Cir. 1960), with Fisher v. United
States, 328 U.S. 463 (1946). It appears that trial courts have wide latitude on the decision
whether or not to admit expert testimony directed to the capacity of a defendant to entertain
the specific intent that is an element of the crime. United States v. Demma, 523 F.2d 981,
986 (9th Cir. 1975).
"I The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals has ruled that even if a defendant
who is competent refuses to raise the defense of insanity, the trial court may itself submit
the insanity defense to the jury. See Whalem v. United States, 346 F.2d 812 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 862 (1965). This involves a serious interference by the court with trial
strategy and the sort of decision a court is ill-equipped to make. The American Law Institute
rejected such a proposal "as being too great an interference with the conduct of the defense."
Model Penal Code § 4.03 Comment (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955). It places defense counsel in an
impossible position, caught between the wishes of his client and the court. See 53 TEX. L.
REv. 1065, 1071-72 (1975).
The D.C. Circuit has stressed that the decision to raise insanity sua sponte should be
made only after a full presentation of all the testimony, including medical expert testimony,
related to criminal responsibility. See United States v. Robertson, 507 F.2d 1148 (D.C. Cir.
1974). In Robertson, dual purpose examinations gave the trial court such information on
sanity. Id. at 1151.
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D. Further Problems
Even if a court may order a compulsory examination into sanity
before the defendant has given notice that he intends to raise the
insanity defense and rely on expert testimony, there are important
reasons for keeping the competency and sanity examinations sepa-
rate.
First, there is much confusion among lawyers concerning the
distinction between competency and insanity.44 Indeed, some de-
fense lawyers are under the impression that section 4244 is the pro-
per means for obtaining psychiatric assistance for a possible insan-
ity defense. 145 Studies indicate that these attorneys are often una-
ware of the common law criteria for competency.' Whatever may
be the defendant's statutory or constitutional rights with respect to
psychiatric examination by the government, it is patent that those
rights cannot be asserted if defendant's counsel misunderstands the
nature of the proceedings. Merging the insanity and competency
issues in a single examination further blurs the distinction and exac-
erbates the confusion.
A problem that is perhaps more serious is that such examina-
tions alter the nature of the competency proceedings and the role
of the psychiatrist. In theory, neither the government nor the de-
fense is entitled to a psychiatrist under section 4244. The appointed
psychiatrist is supposed to be the court's expert; section 4244 pro-
vides that he "shall report to the court."1 47 The cases refer to the
psychiatrist under section 4244 as "an impartial expert,"1' "an offi-
cer of the court, not responsible to the prosecution or the defense."''
'" The confusion that exists among lawyers over the nature of competency is also evident
among psychiatrists. Some have tended to equate competency with mental disease or with
criminal responsibility. See generally McGarry, Demonstration and Research in Competency
for Trial and Mental Illness: Review and Preview, 49 B.U. L. REv. 46, 50 (1969); Roby,
Criteria for Competency to Stand Trial: A Checklist for Psychiatrists, 122 AM. J. PSYCH.
616, 617 (1965); Settle & Oppegard, The Pre-Trial Examination of Federal Defendants, re-
printed in Oliver, Application of Psychiatry to Study, Observation, and Treatment of the
Federal Offender, 35 F.R.D. 381, 479-80 (1964). This tendency to confuse the issues is rein-
forced by asking both questions together.
115 See, e.g., United States v. Walker, 537 F.2d 1192, 1194 (4th Cir. 1976); United States
v. Theriault, 440 F.2d 713, 714 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 984' (1973); United States
v. Taylor, 437 F.2d 371, 377 n.8 (4th Cir. 1971).
"I The Massachusetts Study concluded that "[tlhe majority of defense counsel inter-
viewed in this project were not aware of the common law criteria for competency to stand
trial." MASSACHUsrrS STUDY, supra note 38, at 6. The same study also concluded that a
confusion between criminal responsibility and competency existed in many American juris-
dictions. Id.
117 18 U.S.C. § 4244 (1970).
" United States v. Green, 544 F.2d 138, 145 (3d Cir. 1976).
" United States v. Pogany, 465 F.2d 72, 78 (3d Cir. 1972).
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He is expected to be "neutral and detached"'50 and "to serve the
court in a completely nonpartisan manner."1 51 "An advocacy role,"
it is said, "would be inconsistent with a fair and impartial determi-
nation.' 52 1 shall argue in Section III that the nature of the compe-
tency inquiry makes it important that a court have the assistance
of its own psychiatrist or psychiatrists. Yet to leave the appointment
up to the court is not wholly satisfactory given that identifications
with different schools and value systems make the notion of an
"impartial" psychiatric expert largely illusory.1 53 Whatever weak-
nesses the system of appointments under section 4244 has, broaden-
ing the psychiatrist's role to include what may be the major trial
issue-the question of insanity-magnifies these problems. The
court's expert in this situation begins to look exactly like the govern-
ment's expert. There are disturbing indications that the government
has a degree of control over the nature of the examination that is
inconsistent with the notion that the psychiatrist shall not be
"responsible to the prosecution.' ' 54 This has resulted because gov-
ernment prosecutors have come to view competency proceedings as
an opportunity for discovery.155 This practice, furthermore, has been
encouraged by Justice Department policy.
5 15
' United States v. Stem, 519 F.2d 521, 526-27 (9th Cir. 1975).
'z United States v. Caldwell, 543 F.2d 1333, 1350 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
"' United States v. Pogany, 465 F.2d 72 (3d Cir. 1972).
'= Goldstein & Fine, The Indigent Accused, the Psychiatrist, and the Insanity Defense,
110 U. PA. L. Rxv. 1061, 1072-73 (1962).
"I See, e.g., United States v. Henry, 528 F.2d 661, 663 (D.C. Cir. 1976); United States
v. Pogany, 465 F.2d 72, 77-78 (3d Cir. 1972). See generally Chemoff & Schaeffer, Defending
the Mentally Ill: Ethical Quicksand, 10 AM. CraM. L. Rev. 505, 509-10 (1972).
"I See Krash, The Durham Rule and Judicial Administration of the Insanity Defense in
the District of Columbia, 70 YALE L.J. 905, 911 (1961).
" The United States Attorney's Manual states:
When the examination [for competency] is to be made locally, the order for examina-
tion should also direct that the examiner render an opinion as to the accused's mental
responsibility at the time of the alleged offense, if the U.S. Attorney believes that, in
addition to a determination of competency, an examination as to mental responsibility
at the time of the offense will effect a savings in trial time or would be otherwise
beneficial in the trial or other disposition of the case. The opinion on the accused's
mental responsibility at the time of the offense . . . is to be obtained in cases of local
examinations in view of the fact that the local doctors will be available for testimony
on this issue.
Criminal Division, United States Attorney's Manual ch. 9, at 2 (Aug. 1, 1977). But see United
States v. Alvarez, 519 F.2d 1036, 1044 (3d Cir. 1975).
Because competency is usually raised very early in the proceedings, even prior to indict-
ment, it will often turn out that the dual purpose exam will take place well before the
defendant has been examined by his own psychiatrist for purposes of considering an insanity
defense. That may mean that additional credibility will attach to the earlier exam since it
may be considerably closer to the crime. See Hughes v. United States, 306 F.2d 287, 290 (D.C.
Cir. 1962).
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If dual purpose examinations encourage prosecutors to raise
competency, they deter defense attorneys from raising the question.
I have argued that a defense attorney who believes that his client
may be incompetent is under an obligation to so inform the court,
even if the attorney feels that a finding of incompetency would be
against his client's interest.'7 Obviously a competency motion may
strain the attorney-client relationship in certain circumstances. It
may even be the case that the client is opposed to raising the issue.'58
The use of dual purpose examinations aggravates the problem by
turning counsel's motion into an opportunity for government discov-
ery. Counsel's lot is hard enough without forcing him to risk produc-
ing evidence against his client that could be used to rebut an insan-
ity defense or to prove mens rea.
Traditionally, competency has been viewed as a special issue
that demands that "the proceedings should stop" until competency
was resolved. 55 The injection of trial issues such as the insanity
defense into the competency question is inconsistent with that tra-
dition and ought not to be permitted.
III. THE HEARING
A. The Decision to Hold a Hearing
Section 4244 provides for a hearing if the psychiatric report
indicates that the defendant may be incompetent. Unfortunately,
section 4244 does not require the court to examine the defendant in
every case in which competency is properly raised. If the psychia-
trist's report indicates that the defendant is competent, neither a
hearing on the question nor a finding by the court will be required.60
By allowing the need for a hearing to be determined by the psychia-
trist's conclusion as to the defendant's competency, section 4244
encourages the court to give far too much weight to the bottom line
of the psychiatrist's report. The ultimate legal determination should
be for the court, not the psychiatrist; psychiatric reports are weakest
precisely at the point of drawing legal conclusions from clinical
data. "''
"I See text and notes at notes 43-62 supra.
'5- See, e.g., United States v. David, 511 F.2d 355, 358 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
15' Youtsey v. United States, 97 F. 937, 941 (6th Cir. 1899).
" United States v. Marshall, 458 F.2d 446 (2d Cir. 1972); Stone v. United States, 358
F.2d 503, 506 (9th Cir. 1966); Arnold v. United States, 432 F.2d 871 (10th Cir. 1970); Whalem
v. United States, 346 F.2d 812, 816 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
"I See McGarry, supra note 144, at 58-59. For this reason, the test developed in the
Massachusetts Study draws no conclusion with regard to competency but leaves it up to the
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To allow the court to dispense with a hearing when the psychia-
trist's report indicates that the defendant is competent may raise a
constitutional problem. Pate v. Robinson6 ' seems to suggest that
due process demands a hearing once competency is properly raised.
In Robinson, the Supreme Court of Illinois had ruled that the evi-
dence of incompetency was not sufficient to require a hearing, pri-
marily because the defendant had displayed sufficient mental alert-
ness and understanding during the trial to warrant the judge's con-
clusion that a hearing was unnecessary. 6 3 The Supreme Court re-
versed, holding that although the defendant's demeanor at trial
might be relevant to the ultimate determination, the court could not
simply dispense with a hearing.'64
The Supreme Court may have intended to limit its holding in
Robinson to the situation in which the judge ignores reliable evi-
dence on the question of competency and, solely on the basis of his
own limited observations, refuses to order a hearing. On the other
hand, the decision may have broader application, implying that the
summary dismissal of the question of competency based on only one
piece of evidence would violate due process. Even if the decision
rested on the unreliability of the judge's observations, it could be
argued that the psychiatric report-given the limitations of psychia-
try as a science-is sufficiently fallible that a hearing should be
required even when the report concludes that the defendant is com-
petent. Although federal courts have not viewed Robinson as creat-
ing a right to a hearing in all cases where competency has been
properly raised, " it nonetheless seems unwise to rely exclusively on
the psychiatric report, particularly when only one psychiatrist has
examined the defendant.' 6
B. The Nature of the Hearing: Roles of the Court, Psychiatrist,
and Prosecution
Once it has been determined that a hearing is necessary, the
courts are given wide discretion with regard to the type of evidence
to be presented. Section 4244 provides that "evidence as to the
mental condition of the accused may be submitted, including that
court to weigh the defendant's inabilities in the context of the particular case. MASSACHUSMrrS
STUDY, supra note 38, at 98; see note 170 infra.
1.Z 383 U.S. 375 (1966).
, Id. at 385-86.
l' Id. at 386.
"s See, e.g., United States v. Marshall, 458 F.2d 446, 450 (2d Cir. 1972); Arnold v. United
States, 432 F.2d 871, 874 (10th Cir. 1970).
"I See text and note at note 153 supra.
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of the reporting psychiatrist .. ."I"7 Clearly, the main witnesses at
the hearing should be the psychiatrist (or psychiatrists) and the
defendant. Unlike his role in the context of an insanity defense or
civil commitment proceeding, however, the psychiatrist's role at
the competency hearing should not be dominant. On the contrary,
the court is the body responsible for deciding the issue and it should
not consider the psychiatrist's report as controlling, but simply as
one piece of evidence on the issue.
For several reasons the court may be in a better position to
decide the issue than the psychiatrist. First, neither the presence of
a "mental disease or defect" nor the prediction of "dangerousness"
is necessarily an important factor in determining competency. Al-
though the psychiatrist may expose the existence of certain mental
deficiencies, the court can better evaluate the effect such deficien-
cies will have on the formulation of a defense. '68 Secondly, the major
concern in the competency hearing is the defendant's "present"
mental condition. Unlike the psychiatrist who may only examine
the defendant once, the court can continuously evaluate the defen-
dant's present abilities throughout the trial proceedings. Finally,
the court's inquiry into the defendant's competency is similar to the
type of inquiry that a court routinely makes in ensuring the volun-
tariness of a plea. Although an inquiry into the defendant's under-
standing of the criminal process will generally be more detailed and
careful in a competency hearing,'69 it is a type of inquiry with which
a court should be familiar.'
70
,17 18 U.S.C. § 4244 (1970).
' This may be one reason why § 4244 only requires examination of the defendant by a
single psychiatrist selected by the court. Section 4247, part of the 1949 act that included §
4244, deals with the commitment of prisoners who "probably endanger the safety" of the
officers, property, or interests of the United States. In contrast to § 4244, § 4247 allows the
prisoner to select one of the examining psychiatrists prior to the hearing on dangerousness.
18 U.S.C. § 4247 (1970).
"'I Pursuant to rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, a court is required to
conduct an inquiry prior to the defendant's acceptance of a plea. This inquiry is not sufficient
for determining the competency of the defendant. United States v. Masthers, 539 F.2d 721,
728-29 (D.C. Cir. 1976). It is an inquiry undertaken solely to determine the voluntariness of
the plea; the defendant's competency is assumed.
"' The court's inquiry should include whether the defendant is able: (1) to understand
the charges; (2) to understand the defenses available to him; (3) to distinguish between a plea
of guilty and a plea of not guilty; (4) to understand the basic essentials of criminal trial
proceedings; (5) to follow the evidence; (6) to take the witness stand and testify coherently;
(7) to assist counsel in evaluating the testimony of witnesses; and (8) to recall facts concerned
with the time of the alleged violation. Weiter v. Settle, 193 F. Supp. 318, 321 (W.D. Mo. 1961).
The examinations that have been developed by psychiatrists concerned with the problem of
competency have been aimed at giving the court information on such factors. See Roby,
supra note 144, at 618. The Massachusetts Study developed a test which measures the
[45:21
Competency to Stand Trial
The court should also play a greater role in directing the course
and conduct of the hearing itself. Although section 4244 does not
specify the exact nature of the hearing, the hearing has often been
described as an "adversary hearing,' 7 1 presumably entailing the
right to counsel, the right to present witnesses, and the right to
cross-examination. But to view the hearing on competency as
strictly adversarial in nature creates numerous problems and may
actually defeat the purpose of the hearing.
In the first place, the label "adversary" is somewhat misleading
to the extent that it implies that there are established "defense"
and "prosecution" positions. It cannot be said that the prosecution
as a rule wishes the defendant to be found competent, or that the
defense will'urge incompetency. The position taken by a party will
depend largely on his assessment of his interests in the future of the
criminal proceedings. This assessment is based on certain factors
that vary from case to case, such as the possible severity of sentence,
the strength of the opponent's case, and the advantages to be gained
through delaying the proceedings. Thus, if the defendant faces rela-
tively minor charges, the prosecutor may take the position that
involuntary hospitalization is, if not preferable, at least equivalent
to a criminal sentence on these charges. On the other hand, if the
charges are serious, it may be to the defendant's advantage to be
found incompetent in order to delay or possibly avoid conviction.
To be sure, one can generalize about the adversarial position
likely to be taken by a party in any given situation. To the extent
that courts rely on such generalizations, however, they risk skewing
the competency inquiry. For example, certain notions about
"burdens of proof" on the issue of competency have developed as a
result of reliance on the view that the government has an interest
defendant's abilities on a scale from total incapacity to no incapacity in 13 different functions
needed at trial. The 13 functions are: (1) appraisal of available legal defenses; (2) unmanagea-
ble behavior; (3) quality of relating to attorney; (4) planning of legal strategy, including guilty
plea to lesser charges where pertinent; (5) appraisal of role of (a) defense counsel, (b) prose-
cuting attorney, (c) judge, (d) jury, (e) defendant, (f) witnesses; (6) understanding of court
procedure; (7) appreciation of charges; (8) appreciation of range and nature of possible penal-
ties; (9) appraisal of likely outcome; (10) capacity to disclose to attorney available pertinent
facts surrounding the offense including the defendant's movements, timing, mental state,
actions at the time of the offense; (11) capacity to realistically challenge prosecution wit-
nesses; (12) capacity to testify relevantly; (13) self-defeating v. self-serving motivation (legal
sense). It is fully understood by the proponents of this test that the various incapacities are
not of equal importance and that, for example, a judge might very well conclude that the
capacity to challenge witnesses is to be weighted less heavily than the capacity to testify.
MASSACHUSETrS STuDY, supra note 38, at 98.
"I Stone v. United States, 358 F.2d 503 (9th Cir. 1966); Caster v. United States, 319 F.2d
850, 852 (5th Cir. 1963).
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in proving competency, at least where the charges are serious. In
United States v. DiGilio 72 the Third Circuit, noting that there is
"surprisingly little case law" on the burden of proof question, 7 3 held
that the government has the burden of proving competency by a
preponderance of the evidence." 4 The court reasoned that it would
be senseless to require the defendant to bear the burden of proving
his own incompetency since the whole purpose behind examining
competency is to determine if the defendant is able "to assume any
burden in the adversarial judicial proceeding.'
'7
Leaving aside for the moment the question whether notions of
"burdens" are reconcilable with the purpose of the competency
hearing, the DiGilio decision demonstrates a lack of awareness of
the practical problems faced by the prosecutor. Requiring the prose-
cutor to prove competency ignores the fact that the prosecutor is
severely limited in his access to the type of evidence necessary to
satisfy the burden of proof. Prior to the hearing, the government has
no right to force the defendant to undergo a psychiatric exam con-
ducted by the government's own experts. The prosecuting attorney
may not even have access to the defendant so that he can form his
own opinion about the defendant's present condition. Although the
government will normally have a substantial file on the crime in
question, this information will often be of little help at the compe-
tency hearing, particularly when there is indication that the defen-
dant's mental status has altered or deteriorated since the crime
occurred. Thus, other than the report of the court psychiatrist, the
government at the commencement of the hearing has very little
information with which to evaluate the defendant's competency, let
alone prove it.
More important, the view espoused in DiGilio is at odds with
the fundamental aspects of the law of incompetency to stand trial.
Suppose that the government chose not to contest the finding of the
court-appointed psychiatrist as to the defendant's incompetency.
Would a court be justified in resolving the issue on the basis that
there had been a failure of proof? Similarly, suppose that the de-
fense attorney chose not to present any witnesses, not even the
psychiatrist whose report prompted the hearing, and decided not to
cross-examine government witnesses whose testimony supported
172 538 F.2d 972 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied sub nom. Lupo v. United States, 429 U.S.
1038 (1977).
"I Id. at 986.
17, Id. at 988. See also United States v. Shepard, 538 F.2d 107, 109 (6th Cir. 1976); United
States v. Makris, 535 F.2d 899, 906-07 (5th Cir. 1976).
17" 538 F.2d 972, 987 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied sub nor. Lupo v. United States, 429
U.S. 1038 (1977).
[45:21
Competency to Stand Trial
the competency of the defendant. Should this be decisive of the
outcome?
I think the answer is no. In Pate v. Robinson,' the Supreme
Court scoffed at the notion that a defendant about whom there was
a competency question could "waive" his incompetency. Robinson
was represented by counsel, and the case implies that counsel could
not waive or stipulate competency on behalf of his client. The same
logic suggests that a court cannot resolve the competency issue sim-
ply on the basis of a failure of proof. Once the issue is raised, the
court has the responsibility to determine it correctly. To the extent
the parties have an adverse interest in the outcome, the court's task
will be made easier. But ultimately, as the common law always
recognized, the trial court must see to it that a thorough investiga-
tion of the issue is conducted.
For this reason the approach of the Third Circuit in DiGilio,
which assumed an adversary hearing at which one side or the other
must bear the burden of proof, is misconceived. The burden of de-
termining competency belongs to the court and strategic decisions
by the government or defense counsel should not be decisive in the
outcome.
Section 4244 is consistent with this view of the court's responsi-
bility. The statute permits the court to appoint its own psychiatrist
so that, regardless of the evidence presented by the parties, the
court can obtain expert testimony from a reliable source. If, after
reviewing all of the evidence presented, the court is still undecided
as to whether the defendant is competent, it should find the defen-
dant incompetent rather than proceed to trial. The court's decision
in close cases does not rest on the prosecutor's failure to establish
his burden of showing that the defendant is competent, but on the
trial court's responsibility to "jealously guard" the defendant's right
to a fair trial.'77 In those cases in which the court, on the basis of its
independent inquiry, is convinced of the defendant's competency,
trial should not be delayed simply because the prosecution may not
have marshalled sufficient evidence that the defendant is compe-
tent.
C. The Role of Defense Counsel
The adversary view of the competency hearing also presents
17" 383 U.S. 375, 384 (1966).
' Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 173 (1975); Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 385
(1966). The Supreme Court in both cases described the respective competency statutes as
"jealously guarding" the defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial.
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special problems for defense counsel. If the defense attorney's pri-
mary responsibility is to protect the defendant's exercise of his con-
stitutional rights, what adversarial position should the attorney as-
sume when the issue being determined is the ability of the defen-
dant to exercise his rights? If the defendant has been offered a very
advantageous plea, should the attorney argue vigorously for his
client's competency, even though the attorney personally believes
that the defendant is incompetent? Or in such a case should the
attorney follow his own assessment of his client's competency and
argue that the defendant is incompetent and that any plea would
be involuntary?
If counsel's position at the hearing is limited by his personal
assessment of the defendant's competency, then competency hear-
ings are certainly distinct from other pretrial hearings. Counsel has
no obligation to see that the court makes what counsel personally
believes to be the correct ruling with respect to the suppression of
evidence or the determination of probable cause. It could be argued
similarly that the correct determination of competency is the re-
sponsibility of the court, not defense counsel and therefore, if he
believes that a plea is in his client's best interest, counsel should
take the adversarial position that his client is competent. The prob-
lem with this argument is that defense counsel has a responsibility
for the correct determination of the competency issue that he does
not have with respect to other issues. A trial court's erroneous rul-
ings in favor of the defendant on issues other than competency do
not adversely affect the defendant's constitutional rights; instead,
the court may simply be giving those rights a broader sweep than it
should. But if the court erroneously concludes that the defendant
is competent, the court's decision goes directly to the defendant's
ability to waive or assert his constitutional rights. Although it is the
court's responsibility to determine the issue of competency, counsel
has the obligation, flowing from his duty to protect his client's
rights, to see that the issue is decided correctly. As with the question
of raising the competency issue, counsel is not free to chart an
adversary course at the hearing based on his view of the client's best
interests.
Defense counsel's position at the hearing is further complicated
by the fact that counsel's opinions and observations with respect to
his client's competency may be quite probative. This stems from the
nature of the competency issue, which in part involves the defen-
dant's relationship with his attorney. At the outset of the hearing,
counsel is in a far better position than the court and prosecutor to
form an opinion about the defendant's competency. He will be
aware of any problems in communication or cooperation that might
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hamper the presentation of the defense.7 8 In United States v.
David,' Judge Bazelon took note of defense counsel's special posi-
tion, and urged trial courts to seek counsel's opinion. He pointed out
that "counsel's first-hand evaluation of a defendant's ability to con-
sult on his case and to understand the charges against him may be
as valuable as an expert psychiatric opinion on his competency.",
That counsel could be asked his personal opinion on the ultimate
issue is certainly inconsistent with an adversary view of the hearing.
As I have argued, however, counsel's obligation to protect the defen-
dant's rights entails the duty to aid the court in making the correct
competency decision and a court should be free to make such an
inquiry of defense counsel.
A serious hurdle to examining the attorney as a witness is the
attorney-client privilege. In a much earlier decision, Gunther v.
United States, '8' the D.C. Circuit concluded that such interrogation
would violate the privilege. In Gunther the court remanded for a
new competency hearing, with specific instructions that the former
trial counsel not be called as a witness:
If trial counsel in a criminal case could be called by the Govern-
ment and asked to give an opinion as to the accused's compe-
tency and ability to assist in the defense, he could necessarily
also be asked for the factual data upon which he premised his
opinion. These questions would open to inquiry by the Govern-
ment the entire relationship between the accused and his coun-
sel. Such revelations would be a violation of the attorney-client
' The value of the lawyer's evaluation has been recognized by the Massachusetts Study,
whose objective is to improve the accuracy of the competency determination. The Study
concluded that a lawyer serving as a legal expert should be a part of the examination process.
MASSACHussrrs STury, supra note 38.
Dr. Louis McGarry, the principal investigator of the project, stated that in the course of
previous work on competency, members of the Law-Medicine Institute of Boston University,
the original grantee of the project, had become convinced
that an attorney-consultant was a necessary participant in the accurate appraisal of
competency for trial. Although expertness with respect to the psychopathology on which
a finding of incompetency to stand trial may be based is properly that of the psychiatrist
and psychologist, the degree to which the disability impairs an individual's capacity to
protect himself in the particular circumstances of his case often requires legal expertise.
McGarry, supra note 144, at 53.
'T, 511 F.2d 355 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
"' Id. at 360. Other courts have emphasized the probative value of the defense counsel's
opinion. See United States ex rel. Roth v. Zelker, 455 F.2d 1105, 1108 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
408 U.S. 927 (1972). There is some confusion over the weight to be given counsel's opinion.
See note 193 infra.
"i' 230 F.2d 222 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
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privilege and would also invade an accused's right to counsel
in the trial of the criminal charge." 2
That view was rejected by the Fourth Circuit in United States
v. Kendrick, 13 where the defendant claimed, in a collateral attack,
that he had been incompetent at the time of trial. The Kendrick
court concluded that it was permissible for the defendant's former
trial counsel to testify at such a hearing because the attorney-client
privilege is intended to protect only the substance of communica-
tions made by a client to his attorney in confidence, and not matters
such as physical characteristics and demeanor, which "are not in-
tended to be held in the breast of the lawyer, even though the
attorney-client relation provided the occasion for the lawyer's obser-
vation of them."'' 4 The Kendrick rationale is not entirely satisfac-
tory. If the attorney's opinion is sought because he is in the best
position to judge the difficulty that his client's mental disabilities
presented in formulating a defense, the conclusion seems inescapa-
ble that some of the lawyer's opinions will be based on conversations
that may fall within the scope of the attorney-client privilege. It
may not be quite as simple as the court suggests for the attorney to
distinguish between those observations that fall outside the privi-
lege and those observations that are based on privileged confid-
ences.
There is, however, stronger reason for holding that the interro-
gation of the attorney does not violate the attorney-client privilege.
A defendant who attacks his conviction by claiming that he was not
competent prior to the trial is implicitly charging that his trial
attorney was ineffective in protecting his rights. When it is alleged
that counsel's services were inadequate, the attorney should be al-
lowed to defend his conduct. In addition, it seems inconsistent with
the privilege to permit a defendant to affirmatively allege through
affidavit and testimony that he was unable to understand the pro-
ceedings and consult with counsel, while at the same time offering
the privilege as a bar to counsel's testimony on the matter. The
privilege, in Wigmore's words, "is intended only as an incidental
means of defense, and not as an independent means of attack, and
to use it in the latter character is to abandon it in the former.' 8 5
"I Id. at 223-24.
"3 331 F.2d 110 (4th Cir. 1964).
"I Id. at 113-14. Other circuits have accepted Kendrick and rejected Gunther. See, e.g.,
Clanton v. United States, 488 F.2d 1069 (5th Cir. 1974); Howell v. United States, 442 F.2d
265 (7th Cir. 1971).
"35 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2327, at 638 (McNaughton Rev. 1961).
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The Fifth Circuit, in United States v. Woodall,18 faced the
issue in an analogous situation. In Woodall, the defendant attacked
his guilty plea on the ground that at the time he entered the plea
he was unaware of the maximum penalty that could be imposed. At
the hearing to determine if Woodall was aware of the maximum
penalty, Woodall's former attorney testified that he had advised
Woodall of the maximum penalty. The court en banc held that the
attorney's testimony did not violate the attorney-client privilege
because Woodall's attack on his plea, with its implied charge of
attorney negligence, amounted to a waiver of the privilege. 187 The
court's conclusion was based on the belief that the assertion of the
privilege should not be used affirmatively to subvert or conceal the
truth. The court said that it could not justify a rule permitting a
defendant to assert that he was misinformed, and "then permit him
to run a procedural trap play that would block the development of
the plain truth . . .. "
Questioning defense counsel at a pretrial competency hearing
presents a somewhat different problem from that involved in a col-
lateral attack alleging prior incompetency. The defendant may not
have raised the competency issue; even if he did, it makes little
sense to view the motion as a waiver if the issue is whether the
defendant is presently competent to waive his rights. On the other
hand, it seems very disturbing that a court should have to determine
whether there are presently significant problems between the defen-
dant and his attorney without the ability to seek out the evidence
that might be most probative in determining whether the problems
stem from the client or from the lawyer. The problem seems analo-
" 438 F.2d 1317 (5th Cir. 1970).
' The Fifth Circuit did not reach its conclusion easily. Originally a panel concluded that
the testimony of the defendant's former attorney was improperly admitted because it was
privileged. 438 F.2d at 1319-20. On petition for rehearing the government argued that Woodall
by his attack on his plea was making an implied attack on the effectiveness of counsel. The
petition was denied with a second opinion in which the panel stated it was reluctant to "begin
eroding a rule of ancient origin." 438 F.2d at 1321-22. A petition for rehearing en banc was
granted and the Fifth Circuit held that the privilege had been waived. 438 F.2d at 1324-26.
"I Id. at 1326. The District Court for the District of Columbia had earlier applied the
same rationale to permit counsel to testify in a collateral attack alleging prior incompetency.
United States v. Wiggins, 184 F. Supp. 673 (D.D.C. 1960). The court avoided Gunther by
reading Gunther to bar only opinions by counsel on competency and not "detailed observa-
tions" by counsel. Id. at 673.
The proposed federal rule of evidence on the attorney-client privilege, which was not
enacted, included an exception for "a communication relevant to an issue of breach of duty
by the lawyer to his client . . . ." Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 503(d)(3), 56 F.R.D.
236 (1972). The Advisory Committee Notes state that this exception is required by considera-
tions of "fairness and policy" when questions arise including claims of inadequacy of repre-
sentation. Id. at 240.
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gous to a defense attorney's motion to withdraw based on friction
in the relationship, where courts feel an obligation to inquire into
the nature of the problems even if such problems touch on matters
of trial strategy usually thought to be within the scope of the privi-
lege.1
8 9
The attorney-client privilege should not bar the court's inquiry
into the relationship between the attorney and the client. When the
defendant may not even understand the role of counsel, it seems
artificial to suggest that the privilege blocks inquiry into the rela-
tionship. The court's questioning of defendant's attorney is in part
an inquiry into whether the attorney-client privilege exists. More-
over, the result of finding the attorney-client privilege applicable
would be to trap the defendant in a privilege he is unable to waive
at the hearing. It seems that given the nature of the competency
issue and the importance of an accurate determination to the defen-
dant's exercise of his rights, a court should view a full inquiry into
the relationship between the defendant and the attorney, including
questioning of defense counsel, as part of its responsibility.'10 Any
information obtained at the hearing should not, of course, be used
against the defendant at trial.
If the court is permitted, and even encouraged to seek the opin-
ion of counsel on the ultimate issue of the defendant's ability to
understand the proceedings and present an effective defense, attor-
neys will be deterred from using competency as a strategic move to
avoid or delay a certain conviction, for counsel cannot be both a
witness and an advocate at the same time. Counsel could hardly
testify to his client's :competency and yet argue vigorously in favor
of incompetency."' This consequence may be upsbtting to defense
"I See, e.g., United States v. Main, 443 F.2d 900 (9th Cir. 1971); Jackson v. United
States, 412 F.2d 149 (D.C. Cir. 1969). See also United States v. McMann, 386 F.2d 611 (2d
Cir. 1967) (setting out standard for ruling on withdrawal that requires court to balance
"prejudice to the legitimate interests of the defendant" against "potential disruption of the
proceedings"). These cases do not discuss, or even recognize any attorney-client privilege
difficulties, but they indicate that courts have no hesitancy in examining difficulties in the
relationship.
I" It is important that a court view competency as involving a relationship between the
lawyer and his client and not just as a quality of the defendant. The Massachusetts Study
found that the interpersonal skills of the particular defense attorney and his sustained in-
volvement in working with a defendant could make a difference in whether the defendant was
competent. The Study concluded: "A skillful, supportive attorney who devotes adequate time
to working with mentally ill defendants can maximally facilitate the coping strengths of such
defendants. The converse is equally true." MASSACHUSgrrs STUDY, supra note 38, at 7.
"I The Disciplinary Rules of the Code of Professional Responsibility call for withdrawal
either when a lawyer becomes "a witness on behalf of his client" or when not a witness on
behalf of his client, it is apparent that this testimony "is or may be prejudicial" to this client.
ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONsmiLrry DR 5-102 (1976). Logically, this rule should not
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lawyers who tend to view incompetency and insanity as "two prongs
of a general insanity defense.""'  But competency should not be
viewed as a defense, and the role of counsel in raising and presenting
an insanity defense or any other defense is fundamentally different
from his role when a question arises concerning defendant's ability
to stand trial."3
Of course, counsel's testimony at the hearing may in certain
cases seriously strain the relationship with his client. Such strain
may occur whenever the client views the attorney's testimony as
unfavorable to the determination that the client views as desirable.
But if counsel is obligated to raise the issue, a certain amount of
friction seems inevitable, regardless of whether the attorney testi-
fies. A court confronted with a serious competency question should
be sensitive to such problems and should be ready to appoint new
counsel whenever it becomes apparent that a strain in the relation-
ship may hamper the defense. '94
I have tried to suggest that when the question raised involves
the ability of the defendant to function with counsel in an adversary
setting, the answer cannot be expected to flow from an adversary
hearing. In view of the problems posed for both the prosecutor and
the defense counsel when faced with a question of competency, they
cannot be expected to fulfill their paradigmatic adversarial roles.
This is not meant to deemphasize the importance of the procedural
protections afforded by an adversarial hearing. It is, however, meant
be applied in the context of a competency hearing because of the nonadversarial nature of
the hearing, unless it is clear that the attorney-client relationship is so strained as to impair
their ability to work together.
12" Foote, supra note 51, at 834.
I To the extent that there is confusion over the role of counsel at the hearing, it is
difficult for a court to know how to evaluate statements by counsel at the hearing. In McKin-
ney v. State, 566 P.2d 653, 660 (Alaska 1977), the Alaska Supreme Court indicated that
although defense counsel's assessment of competency "should be accorded substantial
weight," this only applied if defense counsel offered the opinion that his client was competent.
The court stated that the same weight need not be given counsel's assertion that the client
is incompetent because "an attorney's duty as an advocate will often require him to present
those arguments on behalf of his client, and while his opinion is still relevant, it is not
determinative." Id. The implication seems to be that if counsel offers or is called on for his
personal assessment of his client's competence his duty as an advocate may require him to
give an opinion that is not his honest opinion but is his "advocate's opinion" and can therefore
be ignored.
Until courts and lawyers are clear on the role of defense counsel at the hearing and the
nature of the hearing, there is always going to be confusion over the weight to be attached to
counsel's remarks. There should be no need for "rules" to guide trial courts in assessing
evidence. Certainly the suggestion of the Alaska Supreme Court that the nature of the opinion
indicates when counsel is acting as an advocate is questionable advice. See text preceding
note 178 supra.
"I See note 191 supra.
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to suggest that the trial court must play a far greater role in direct-
ing the course of the competency hearing than it plays in conducting
other kinds of hearings. Rather than rely on adversarial procedures
of cross-examination and burdens of proof, the court in a compe-
tency hearing should control the course of the hearing, both in call-
ing witnesses and in questioning witnesses. Such control should not
be viewed as discretionary-it is mandated by the court's ultimate
responsibility for the proper determination of the competency issue.
IV. REFORM
I have argued in this article that competency proceedings in
federal courts are frequently misunderstood and misused. To a large
extent, these problems arise from a failure to consider in detail the
full implications of the competency issue. Although section 4244 was
an important step in forcing courts to recognize the problem of
competency, it fails to deal with some of the major aspects of the
problem. As a result, the courts have had to face such problems in
a piecemeal fashion - an approach that is no doubt responsible for
some of the present confusion in the area. A new statute on compe-
tency is now pending in Congress as part of the general reform of
the Criminal Code Reform Act of 1977. Although the proposed stat-
ute, embodied in S. 1437, is for the most part modeled after section
4244,111 it does propose several significant changes.
Section 3611 of the new code would make two major improve-
ments in the rules governing competency. The first of these im-
provements is the establishment of a specific upper limit on the
length of time that a defendant who is found incompetent may be
institutionalized pending his recovery. A defendant found to be in-
competent can be hospitalized for at most four months in order to
determine whether there is a substantial probability that the defen-
dant will regain competency. If, after the initial four months, there
appears to be a substantial probability of recovery, he can be hospi-
talized for at most an additional two months.' The result is that a
113 The bill, S. 1437, which is entitled the "Criminal Code Reform Act of 1977" was
introduced into the Senate on May 2, 1977, by Senators Edward Kennedy and John McClel-
lan. S. 1437, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REc. S6833-41 (daily ed. May 2, 1977). The
Senate Committee on the Judiciary reported the bill, with revisions, on Nov. 15, 1977. The
revised text of the bill is contained in S. REP. No. 95-605, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977)
[hereinafter cited as S. 1437].
'" Section 3611(d) provides that upon a finding by a preponderance of evidence that the
defendant is incompetent,
the court shall commit the defendant to the custody of the Attorney General. The
Attorney General shall hospitalize the defendant for treatment in a suitable facility:
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defendant found to be incompetent could be hospitalized for six
months maximum. However the proposed statute specifically allows
the government the option of civil commitment proceedings when
a defendant is permanently incompetent."
7
The second major improvement proposed by section 3611 is
that a hearing would be required in every case in which competency
is properly raised."' To require a hearing whenever the issue is
raised seems consistent with the emphasis placed on the hearing in
Robinson and Drope. It would be a welcome contrast to section 4244,
which requires a hearing only if the psychiatric report concludes
that the defendant is incompetent."' Unfortunately, the view per-
sists that the hearing should be an adversary hearing. Subsection
3611(c) incorporates the hearing procedures of section 3616(d),
which provides that the defendant "shall be afforded an opportu-
nity to testify, to present evidence, to subpoena witnesses on his
behalf, and to confront and cross-examine witnesses who appear at
the hearing. ' '200 Moreover, the proposed statute apparently intends
to reverse the present "burden of proof"20' by requiring the court
to find "by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant is
presently suffering from a mental disease or defect rendering him
mentally incompetent. '202 Even the present law under section 4244
(1) for such a reasonable period of time, not to exceed four months, as is necessary
to determine whether there is a substantial probability that in the foreseeable
future he will attain the capacity to permit the trial to proceed; and
(2) for an additional reasonable period of time, not to exceed two months until:
(A) his mental condition is so improved that trial may proceed, if the court
finds that there is a substantial probability that within such additional period of
time he will attain the capacity to permit the trial to proceed; or
(B) the pending charges against him are disposed of according to law;
whichever is earlier.
S. 1437 § 3611(d), supra note 195, at 262.
I" S. 1437 § 3611(d), supra note 195, at 262. The proposed federal code contains a
broadened civil commitment statute. See S. 1437 § 3615, supra note 195, at 267-70.
"' Section 3611(a) reads as follows:
At any time after the commencement of a prosecution for an offense and prior to
the sentencing of the defendant, the defendant or the attorney for the government may
file a motion for a hearing to determine the mental competency of the defendant. The
court shall grant the motion, or shall order such a hearing on its own motion, if there is
reasonable cause to believe that the defendant may presently be suffering from a mental
disease or defect rendering him mentally incompetent to the extent that he is unable to
understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings against him or to assist in
his defense.
S. 1437 § 3611(a), supra note 195, at 261.
"I See text and note at note 160 supra.
2N S. 1437 § 3616(d), supra note 195, at 271.
"' See text and note at note 172 supra.
212 S. 1437 § 3611(d), supra note 195, at 262.
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seems preferable to this change in burdens of proof. The new statute
misconceives the responsibility of the trial court. It will permit the
court to try a defendant even if the court, after having heard the
evidence, remains uncertain as to the defendant's competency.
As I have suggested, the concept of an adversarial competency
hearing creates numerous problems and obscures the major purpose
behind competency inquiries. Any reform of section 4244 should
begin by squarely placing the responsibility for the proper determi-
nation of competency where it belongs - on the trial court. Thus, I
would propose the following reform:
Whenever the issue of competency is raised, the trial court
shall conduct and control a thorough hearing into the compe-
tency of the defendant. The court shall hear testimony from the
defendant and the examining psychiatrist(s) in order to assure
itself of the competency of the defendant.
By placing the burden on the court to conduct and control the
inquiry into the defendant's competency, this proposal accords with
the traditional view that the trial court bears the responsibility to
correctly determine the competency question. The second sentence
of the proposal recognizes that the issue of competency is simply too
important to permit the court to resolve the issue without hearing
from both the defendant and the psychiatrist, or psychiatrists, who
examined the defendant. If the waiver of constitutional rights in a
guilty plea demands the "utmost solicitude of which events are
capable in canvassing the matter with the accused,110 3 this same
solicitude should be shown in determining the defendant's ability
to understand the proceedings when there is reason to believe that
he may be incompetent.
The proposed statute makes a number of changes with regard
to raising the issue of competency. First, it squarely obligates the
trial court to order a hearing sua sponte if there is "reasonable cause
to believe" that the defendant may be incompetent. 4 This has
always been viewed as the trial court's obligation.0 ' However, while
section 4244 placed the same obligation on the government attor-
ney, the proposed statute indicates only that "the attorney for the
government may file a motion for a hearing to determine the mental
competency of the defendant. '" 2 6 This change may be constitution-
"' Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243-44 (1969).
' S. 1437 § 3611(a), supra note 195, at 261.
See text and notes at notes .25-31 supra.
20 S. 1437 § 3611(a), supra note 195, at 261.
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ally infirm if it is meant to relieve the prosecutor of his obligation
to raise the issue. Due process would seem to require a prosecutor




With regard to defense counsel, section 3611 provides only that,
like the government, "the defendant. . . may file a motion. ' 28 This
change does nothing to dispel the uncertainty that exists over de-
fense counsel's obligation to raise incompetency. I have argued that
counsel should have no choice but to raise the issue of competency.
However, the position I have put forward runs counter to the in-
stincts of many attorneys; indeed, even those who have recognized
the issues involved have expressed uncertainty over the course of
action counsel should take when faced with a competency prob-
lem.20' Unfortunately, section 3611 provides no more guidance than
does section 4244. In place of the reform proposed by section 3611,
I would suggest adoption of the following principle:
It shall be the obligation of the government attorney and the
defense attorney to file a motion for judicial determination of
the accused's competency whenever either of them has reason
to believe the defendant may be incompetent. Whenever the
court has reason to believe the defendant may be incompe-
tent, it shall, on its own motion, cause the accused to be
examined as to his mental condition.
Except with regard to the role of the defense attorney, this
proposal would be a fair statement of the present law. It not only
incorporates the government attorney's obligation to raise compe-
tency under section 4244, but also reflects present caselaw with
regard to the court's obligation to raise the competency issue.2t0
Finally, this proposal clearly spells out the obligation of the defense
attorney who previously had no guidance in this regard.
Section 3611 makes no changes in the protections afforded the
defendant either at the time of the examination or at the hearing.
Although section 3612 does provide for a psychiatric examination
upon government motion into sanity at the time of the offense,211 the
Judiciary Committee Report specifically notes that this statute is
not meant to limit the inherent judicial power to order an examina-
"I See text and notes at notes 66-73 supra.
" S. 1437 § 3611(a), supra note 195, at 261.
" See CHFNoFF & SCHAmER, supra note 60, at 519.
216 See text and notes at notes 25-31 supra.
211 S. 1437 § 3612(a), supra note 195, at 263.
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tion into sanity. 12 Thus, section 3611, like section 4244, will no
doubt be viewed as consistent with the court's power to order dual
purpose examinations.
The practice of ordering defendants to submit to dual purpose
examinations raises serious constitutional questions. It forces a de-
fendant to submit to an unnecessarily intensive and probing exami-
nation without requiring any showing of need on the part of the
government and impinges on values underlying the privilege against
self-incrimination. It encourages prosecutors to misuse competency,
by turning the issue into a vehicle for early government discovery
on sanity even though rule 12.2 implies that such discovery should
be available only upon notice of an intent to raise the insanity
defense. 213 The use of the competency examination as a vehicle for
discovery is plainly inconsistent with the nonadversarial theory of
the competency inquiry. A proposal should be adopted to provide:
Any court-ordered examination as to the accused's competency
to stand trial must be strictly limited to the issue of compe-
tency. The examining psychiatrist(s) may not, on the basis of
this examination, testify on the issue of the defendant's mental
condition or sanity at the time of the offense.
Not only does section 3611 permit dual purpose examinations,
it also contains a change that may further confuse the issues of
competency and insanity. One objective of the draftsmen was to
incorporate into the statute the standard by which competency is
to be determined. The proposed statute frames the issue in terms
of whether
the defendant may be presently suffering from a mental disease
or defect rendering him mentally incompetent to the extent
that he is unable to understand the nature and consequences
of the proceedings against him or to assist in his defense.
24
By injecting the criterion of a "mental disease or defect" responsible
212 CRIMINAL CODE REFORM ACT OF 1977, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY OF
THE UNITED STATES SENATE, S. REP. No. 95-605, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1035 (1977).
23 The timing of an examination into sanity can be very important. If there is a signifi-
cant difference in the dates on which conflicting experts examined the defendant, the earlier
examination may carry more weight with a jury because it is closer to the date of the crime.
See Hughes v. United States, 306 F.2d 287, 289 (D.C. Cir. 1962). If the government is forced
to wait until the defense gives appropriate notice under rule 12.2, the defense psychiatrists
will have examined the defendant first. By raising competency and obtaining a dual purpose
examination, the timing problem may work to the advantage of the government.
24 S. 1437 § 3611(a), supra note 195, at 261.
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for the defendant's incompetency, the statute adds, at best, a guar-
anteed source of confusion and, at worst, a potentially mischievous
new element. In Dusky v. United States, the Supreme Court stated
that the "test must be whether [the defendant] has sufficient pres-
ent ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of
rational understanding-and whether he has a rational as well as a
factual understanding of the proceedings against him. 21 No men-
tion is made of "mental disease or defect"; the test is framed in
purely functional terms.21 1 Use of the terms "mental disease or de-
fect" in the proposed statute invites confusion and may lead to the
same kind of problems that have plagued the administration of the
insanity defense.
There is an additional problem with regard to the defendant's
testimony at the hearing that is not adequately addressed by either
section 4244 or the proposed statute. Section 4244 prohibits the use
at trial of a defendant's statements to his psychiatrist. But there is
nothing in section 4244 that prohibits the use at trial of defendant's
statements at the competency hearing. Surely a defendant cannot,
consistently with the fifth amendment, be required to testify at the
hearing at the price of incriminating himself.
217
The protection afforded the defendant's statements under sec-
tion 3611 would be identical to that in section 4244218 and would be
just as inadequate. Under section 3611, the defendant's statements
to the psychiatrist are not "admissible as evidence against the ac-
cused on the issue of guilt. ' 21' No protection is given the defendant's
215 362 U.S. at 402.
211 It appears that the injection of the phrase "mental disease or defect" into the compe-
tency standard started with the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code which used the
phrase in its standard for competency. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.04 (1962). But the draft
of § 4.04 was completed in 1955, several years prior to the decision in Dusky v. United States,
362 U.S. 402 (1960). See MODEL PENAL CODE (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
217 In Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968), the Supreme Court held that
testimony by a defendant in order to establish standing to assert his fourth amendment rights
could not be used against the defendant at trial. The competency situation is far stronger
because (1) the court needs such testimony to make its determination; (2) the issue at stake
goes right to the voluntariness of the defendant's testimony; and (3) the defendant may not
have even raised the issue. The defendant should be protected not only against substantive
use of such statements but their use as a source of leads or for purposes of impeachment. See
Blaisdell v. Commonwealth, - Mass. - , 364 N.E.2d 191, 199 (1977).
218 Section 3616(g) of the proposed statute provides that any "statement made by the
defendant during the course of a psychiatric examination pursuant to section 3611 or 3612 is
not admissible as evidence against the accused on the issue of guilt in any criminal proceed-
ing." S. 1437 § 3616(g), supra note 195, at 272.
1I If anything, it is clearer that the protection of § 3616 given to the defendant's state-
ments, see note 218 supra, is not meant to bar a psychiatrist from testifying against the
defendant in rebuttal of an insanity defense, since § 3616 applies to examinations into sanity
under § 3612 which are expressly for the purpose of rebutting such a defense.
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statements at the hearing. To alleviate this problem, the statute
should provide:
No statements made by the defendant in the course of the
examination or at the hearing shall be admissible against the
defendant at trial.
There is one other minor change22 in the proposed statute re-
garding the psychiatric examination and the determination of com-
petency. Under the proposed statute a psychiatric examination
would no longer be mandatory upon a showing of reasonable
cause, 2 ' although the Senate Judiciary Committee Report suggests
that it would be an abuse of discretion for a court to refuse to order
an examination "where the facts warrant an examination." '222 It is
not clear why an examination is not warranted whenever there is
reasonable cause to believe the defendant might be incompetent.
Although the proposed statute would effect some welcome re-
forms, the more serious problems that have arisen under section
4244 have not been addressed. Extensive overhaul of the compe-
tency provisions is badly needed.
CONCLUSION
Despite its long history, the issue of competency to stand trial
has never received the attention that scholars have lavished on the
insanity defense. As a result, we seem to have lost perspective on
the issue, leading to serious confusion in the federal courts. Indeed,
several years ago the prohibition against the trial of an incompetent
defendant was attacked as a piece of "common law theology,"
largely outmoded in these days when counsel can carry on the battle
even if the defendant cannot.
2
1
While arguing that procedures for determining competency are
22 It should be noted that S. 1437, as it stood before the most recent revision by the
Senate Judiciary Committee, would also have required the appointment of two court-selected
psychiatrists for any examination into competency. S. 1437 § 3617(b)(1), 95th Cong., 1st
Sess., 123 CONG. Rac. S6833-41 (daily ed. May 2, 1977). This would have been a welcome
departure from § 4244's heavy reliance on the "neutral expertise" of a single psychiatrist.
However, the Senate Judiciary Committee reconsidered the question and revised what
is now § 3616(b)(1) to eliminate the two-psychiatrist requirement. S. 1437 § 3616(b)(1), supra
note 195, at 270. This seems unfortunate because, as a Senate Judiciary Report had earlier
noted, there was a "significant variation of expert judgment" on the competency issue.
CmMINAL JUSTInE CODFICATION, REviSION AND REFORM ACT OF 1974, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE
ON THE JUDICIARY OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 1003 (1975).
22 S. 1437 § 3611(b), supra note 195, at 261.
222 See Criminal Code Reform Act of 1974, supra note 212, at 1030.
21 Burt & Morris, supra note 51, at 75-76.
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confused to the point of raising serious constitutional problems, I
have also attempted to show that this "common law theology" had
its origins in a belief that the defendant must be able to play a
meaningful role in his trial- a belief that Faretta suggests is still
very much alive. A corollary of this imperative is that the role of
counsel in a criminal defense is, in the final analysis, the role of an
assistant only. Until this limited role of counsel is understood, seri-
ous problems concerning counsel's obligation to raise competency,
the nature of the hearing, and the role of the court will continue to
plague the issue of competency.
